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An Abstract of the Thesis by: 
Robert Neil Cooper 
 
 
Throughout Kansas City Missouri’s history, the parks and boulevards system, 
restrictive covenants, real estate and lending practices, urban redevelopment, public 
housing, and racial steering have contributed to the establishment and continuance of 
housing segregation.  Although historians have studied these main types of housing 
segregation and the federal government’s actions thoroughly, little work exists to show 
how Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal government has influenced housing segregation.  
By examining Kansas City’s municipal response to the aforementioned types of 
segregation, it is clear that city officials have taken steps to both aid and discourage 
segregationist housing practices.  Although municipal agencies, like the Commission on 
Human Relations, have discouraged segregation through their support of FOCUS and 
educational programs, other agencies, such as the City Plan Commission, have 
encouraged it through urban renewal and public housing policies.  Kansas City’s 
municipal response to segregated housing demonstrates that municipal agencies have 
contributed to the continuation of housing segregation by displacing residents through 
urban renewal projects and by fostering racial stereotypes.  In addition, Kansas City’s 
municipal government has allowed private segregationist efforts to persist through the 
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Residential housing segregation has been a central issue within Kansas City since 
the onset of the twentieth century.  The increase of white suburbanization has left both 
city cores with disproportionate numbers of black residents while suburban communities 
have remained primarily white throughout their history.  Although affecting Kansas City, 
Kansas and Kansas City, Missouri, the primary focus of this study centers on Kansas 
City, Missouri’s political structure, which held considerably more control over the 
implementation of urban and suburban politics because of its annexation efforts and 
home rule charter.  In addition, Kansas City, Missouri has remained more residential and 
retains a larger political and tax structure than Kansas City, Kansas.  
Adna Weber’s The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century a Study in 
Statistics (1899) was among the first works to examine American suburbanization.  
However, scholars did not begin to explore how suburban growth affected racial 
concentration within metropolitan areas until the emergence of the civil rights movement 
in the 1950s.  Charles Abram’s Forbidden Neighbors (1955) comprehensively studied the 
role of realtors, homeowner’s associations, and federal policies in the creation of 




housing represents segregation, not social reform.1  Scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s 
expanded upon Abram’s work by arguing that additional factors led to suburbanization, 
yet these works all suggested that federal policy supported segregation in public housing.  
Views on the racial impact of public housing did not change until the 1980s.  
Historian Kevin Gotham argues that Heywood Sanders’ Urban Renewal and the 
Revitalized City (1980), Arnold Hirsh’s Making the Second Ghetto (1983), and Nancy 
Kleniewski’s From Industrial to Corporate City (1984), “have shown that urban renewal 
was never a single, national program, as researchers and policy analysts contended during 
the 1960s and 1970s.”2  Since the 1980s, contemporary research has continued to place 
increased emphasis on the role of municipal governments within the housing market.  
Although works such as Charles Lamb’s Housing Segregation in Suburban America 
since 1960 (2005) view segregated housing through the lens of national policy, Lamb 
acknowledges that “federal, state, and local governments have all contributed to housing 
segregation.”3  In addition, other researchers include multiple metropolitan areas within 
their case studies to magnify the differences in the implementation of federal policy at the 
municipal and state level.  For example, Edward Goetz’s New Deal Ruins (2013) shows 
these disparities by including studies conducted on Chicago, New Orleans, and Atlanta. 
Historian Louis Woods argues that the main thesis presented in Charles Abram’s 
Forbidden Neighbors (1955) remained prevalent until challenged by Stephen Meyer’s As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Louis Woods, “Historiographic Essay: Suburbanization and Post-War American Life,” 
(Murfreesboro: Middle Tennessee State University, 2010), 7. 
 
2 Kevin Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City 
Experience, 1900-2010 2nd ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014), 92. 
 
3 Charles M. Lamb, Housing Segregation in Suburban America Since 1960: Presidential 





Long as They Don’t Move Next Door (2000).4  While Abram argued that government 
policy and private industry created segregated suburbanization, Meyer argues that this 
suburbanization manifested from deep-seated racial prejudice.5  Since Meyer’s work, 
historians who argue that suburbanization and housing segregation stemmed from racial 
prejudice use one of three theories:  class, voluntary segregation, or involuntary 
segregation.  While the voluntary segregation theory argues that racial and class groups 
choose to live in cohesive neighborhoods, class and involuntary segregation theorists 
argue that housing segregation occurs because of longstanding economic barriers 
between different racial groups with disproportionate income levels.6   
Although each theory applies to differing situations of housing segregation, 
together all three only begin to explain Kansas City’s housing problem.  Factors such as 
class, race, education, and community all played a decisive role in the creation and 
continuance of housing segregation.  While it is clear that several scholars have studied 
the effect that government policy, private industry, and racial bigotry had on 
suburbanization and segregation within housing markets, few have conducted 
comprehensive studies that solely examine segregated housing within the metropolitan 
area of Kansas City, Missouri.  Furthermore, even fewer have studied how Kansas City, 
Missouri’s municipal government affected housing segregation within the city.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Wood, 13.  
 
5 Stephen G. Meyer, As Long as They Don’t Move Next Door: Segregation and Racial 
Conflict in American Neighborhoods (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000), 
viii. 
 
6 John M. Goering, ed., Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy (Chapel Hill: The 




Only three recent works examine Kansas City’s housing segregation directly:  
Kevin Gotham’s Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development (2014), Sherry Schirmer’s 
A City Divided (2002), and James Shortridge’s Kansas City and How it Grew (2012).  
Although these works cover similar events, their main focal points contrast.  For 
example, Schirmer’s work, A City Divided, primarily focuses on Kansas City’s racial and 
social composition of the 1920s in the attempt to explain white racial mentality within 
Kansas City, why racial stereotypes have become institutionalized, and how Kansas 
City’s black population worked as a collective to reshape racial perceptions.7  In contrast, 
James Shortridge’s Kansas City and How it Grew focuses on the evolving geography of 
Kansas City’s metropolitan area.  Shortridge examines how major geographical changes 
like the parks and boulevards system, the growth of Kansas City’s business district, and 
urban renewal have affected the city’s physical and racial landscape.8  While Shortridge 
touches on several events that had a direct impact on housing segregation within Kansas 
City, his primary focus remains on geographical growth and movement while rarely 
mentioning municipal policies.  
Kevin Gotham’s Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development is the most 
definitive work covering segregation within Kansas City’s housing market.  Although 
Gotham provides an in-depth examination of both public and private housing segregation, 
his work examines “the role of the real estate industry and federal housing policy in the 
development of racial residential segregation and uneven development, focusing on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Sherry L. Schirmer, A City Divided: The Racial Landscape of Kansas City: 1900-1960 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002), 8.  
 
8 James R. Shortridge, Kansas City and How it Grew, 1822-2011 (Lawrence: University 





case study of metropolitan Kansas City.”9  Gotham does provide some insight as to how 
municipal politics have influenced Kansas City’s racial housing segregation; however, 
his focus on the real estate industry limits this topic.  Generally, Gotham only provides 
discussions on municipal policies if they affected the real estate market directly.  
Together, Shortridge, Schirmer, and Gotham provide a basic outline of how 
Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal agencies created racially segregated neighborhoods 
through their urban renewal programs, yet they do not attempt to explain why Kansas 
City’s municipal government chose not to interfere with the private segregation efforts of 
community builders, homeowners associations, lenders, or real estate interests.  Although 
Gotham and Shortridge mention the anti-segregation attempts of the Human Relations 
Commission and Kansas City’s Direct Housing Allowance, they neglect to explain why 
these organizations failed to produce positive results.  Furthermore, these authors fail to 
highlight the decisive role that Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal government has had in 
the creation of housing segregation and the continuation of racial stereotyping.  
This thesis addresses this gap in scholarship by examining how Kansas City, 
Missouri’s municipal government has worked at cross-purposes to both aid and 
discourage the growth of residential segregation.  Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal 
response to segregationist efforts in the private and political realms reveals that its 
reactionary anti-segregation law has allowed the perpetuation of racial steering and the 
adverse effects of urban renewal. Although Kansas City’s municipal government plays a 
direct role in the continuance of some private and public segregation, it does not hold the 
authority to interfere with other public and private organizations that encourage housing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





segregation.  Furthermore, Kansas City’s municipal response to segregated housing 
demonstrates that municipal agencies have contributed to the continuation of housing 
segregation by displacing residents through urban renewal projects and by fostering racial 
stereotypes that have led to increased housing segregation.  Although some of Kansas 
City’s municipal agencies have attempted to discourage segregationist efforts through 
their support of the Human Relations Commission and anti-discriminatory law, others 
have neglected to implement anti-segregation practices, and therefore, these 
organizations have both aided and discouraged the continuance of housing segregation.  
 
Housing Segregation: An Overview 
 
Residential segregation within Kansas City was not evident until the late 1800s, 
when Kansas City’s elite began to move south because of the constriction of property 
within the inner city.  Although elite suburbanization influenced the growth of racial 
enclaves, Sherry Schirmer argues that these concentrations of minorities grew because of 
social class and work proximity.10  While social elites began to build residential housing 
south of the city, Kansas City’s municipal government began city beautification efforts 
that would place parks and boulevards around elite neighborhoods while displacing low-
income residents who sought housing within preexisting enclaves.  
Although Schirmer argues that elite movement south and the growth of racial 
enclaves were the result of class differences, racially homogeneous neighborhoods began 
to exclude homebuyers by race at the start of the twentieth century.  Eventually, this 
exclusion led to legally enforceable racial deed restrictions, also known as racially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





restrictive covenants, to become Kansas City’s main form of segregation.11  These 
covenants, later backed by homeowners associations, successfully excluded black 
residents from white neighborhoods well after the Supreme Court ruled them 
unenforceable in 1946.12  Although Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal government held 
the power to enforce the Supreme Court’s ruling, real estate efforts, paired with a lack of 
municipal initiative, allowed their continuation. 
As community builders and real estate officials continued to pursue legal means 
of excluding minority residents from suburban areas, Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal 
government began efforts to create public housing and enact urban renewal projects that 
sought to eradicate urban slums.  Municipal agencies generally placed both urban 
renewal and public housing within the city’s urban core, driving displaced low-income 
minorities into inner city neighborhoods.  Although conducted through both federal and 
state policies, Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal government had a decisive role in 
determining the amount of participation and the placement of said projects.13 
While urban renewal and public housing drove minorities into Kansas City’s 
urban core, the effort of Kansas City, Missouri’s School District to maintain racial 
segregation began to drive white residents into suburban areas.14  Taking advantage of the 
effects of school desegregation, real estate agencies also fueled racial movement within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development, 42-48. 
 
12 Richard R.W. Brooks, “Covenants without Courts: Enforcing Residential Segregation 
with Legally Unenforceable Agreements,” The American Economic Review 101 no. 3 (May 
2011): 360. 
13 Kansas City Commission on Human Relations, Report on Relocation Practices of the 
Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (Kansas City, 1974), 11. 
 





Kansas City by their increased participation in blockbusting.  Although Kansas City, 
Missouri’s municipal government had implemented policies against blockbusting and 
racial steering, its efforts were mostly reactive and gave enforcement agencies little 
power.15 
While municipal efforts attempted to curb housing segregation within the city as 
early as the 1950s, Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal government has yet to implement a 
proactive housing policy.16  Discussion on united housing policy has begun to surface 
within Kansas City while the suburbanization of minorities becomes more prevalent.  
However, the city’s urban core remains disproportionately black, and most suburban 
areas remain disproportionately white.17  In conclusion, the municipal government has 
both aided and discouraged housing segregation within Kansas City to varying degrees 
through its response to suburbanization, urban renewal, public housing, school 
desegregation, and racial steering.  Since Kansas City lacked any united housing policy 
and held a mostly reactive stance on segregation, its municipal agencies have conducted a 
confusing and often contradictory array of efforts to combat segregation, allowing private 
and political segregation attempts to flourish throughout the twentieth century.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development, 149-50. 
16 Office of the City Auditor, Special Report: Kansas City Needs a Housing Policy 
(Kansas City, 2000). 
 














THE BOARD OF PUBLIC WELFARE AND THE PARKS AND BOULEVARDS 
SYSTEM 
 
Kansas City began rapidly expanding in the 1880s, primarily because of a real 
estate boom that attracted outside investors to the city.  At the onset of 1880, Kansas City 
had an assessed value of thirteen million dollars, with real estate sales valued at five 
million for the year.  During the peak boom year of 1887, this number had risen to an 
average of eighty-nine million in yearly real estate sales, driven by a host of outside 
investors who bought and sold property.  The development of the Goodrich addition, 
located between Baltimore and Broadway and spanning from Seventeenth to Twenty-
First Street, is one example of construction during this lucrative period.  Acquired for 
eight hundred thousand dollars by a real estate firm in 1886 and divided into sub-plots, 
Goodrich sold for a total profit of one million dollars in less than a year’s time.18  
Although subdivisions were rare prior to 1880, expansions plotted during the mid-1880s 
paved the way for further land development when real estate firms and individuals 
realized how lucrative subdividing could be.  Kansas City land developers assumed the 
task of subdividing after the bottom fell out of the real estate market in 1888, leaving land 
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prices below reasonable value and detouring further land purchases from outside 
investors.19 
 
Early Racial Enclaves and Affluent Neighborhoods 
 
 
Although census data shows that African Americans lived throughout Kansas 
City’s wards during the 1880s and 1890s, both class and racial enclaves were prevalent.20  
Quality Hill, located near the West Bottoms, was the preferred choice for affluent whites 
during this period.  Other affluent neighborhoods included Gladstone, extending from 
Highland Avenue to Gladstone Boulevard along Independence Avenue, and a 
development along Troost Avenue, spanning south of Twenty-Sixth Street, later known 
as Millionaire’s Row.21  
Located just west of Quality Hill, Hell’s Half Acre stood as one of Kansas City’s 
oldest black enclaves.  Originating in the late 1860s, Hell’s Half Acre grew alongside 
Kansas City’s population in the 1880s, attracting unskilled laborers because of its 
proximity to Kansas City’s rail yards and packinghouses.  Although Hell’s Half Acre 
housed a higher percentage of blacks than most Kansas City neighborhoods, the black 
population was still a minority, constituting only 33% of the total occupants.22 
A second black enclave, known as Church Hill and financed by Kersey Coats, 
was located between Eighth and Twelfth Street, Holmes and Troost.  Only African 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 64.  
20 Schirmer, 32. 
21 Shortridge, 50-53.  




Americans bought property in areas of Church Hill until 1870. 23 Church Hill housed 
approximately 15% of Kansas City’s black population by 1900, most of whom worked as 
domestic laborers for the adjacent upper class neighborhoods; however, the area 
remained integrated in both class and race.24 
Other black enclaves during the late 1800s included Belvidere and Hicks Hollow, 
north of Independence Avenue and east of Troost, and the Vine Street corridor, located 
between Troost and Woodland from Twelfth to Twenty-Fifth Street.  Having first served 
as an encampment for Exodusters who fled to the north after the federal withdrawal of 
troops from southern states in 1877, Belvidere and Hicks Hollow grew rapidly after 1890 
by attracting blacks who could afford to leave Hell’s Half Acre and the surrounding West 
Bottoms.  Although Belvidere and Hicks provided better accommodations than Hell’s 
Half Acre, these neighborhoods were in disrepair, containing poorly built houses and few 
sanitation facilities.  By 1900, Kansas City, Kansas also received an influx black 
residents who could afford to leave the West Bottoms and Hell’s Half Acre for better 
housing.  James Shortridge argues that these blacks choose Kansas City, Kansas over 
Missouri because of Kansas’ racially progressive views spurred by black civic leaders 
within the state.25  
Much like Church Hill, the Vine Street corridor surpassed most racial enclaves of 
the late 1800s.  Also known as Negro Quality Hill, the Vine Street corridor was full of 
spacious two-story homes constructed during the boom years of 1880 through 1887.  Real 
estate agents and homeowners sold these mostly vacant homes to anyone who was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23Shortridge, 54.  
24 Schirmer, 36-37. 




willing to buy them, regardless of color, after the collapse of the real estate market in 
1888.26  Although these racial enclaves housed large portions of Kansas City’s black 
population during the late 1800s, Sherry Schirmer argues that these areas most likely 
formed around social class and a need for work proximity, not involuntary segregation 
efforts.27  Although this may be the case, the racial enclaves later grew to be 
homogeneous, housing nearly all of Kansas City’s black residents. 
As racial enclaves expanded during the late-1800s, affluent neighborhoods 
became increasingly constricted.  Since zoning laws were not a factor within Kansas 
City, slums developed adjacent to upper-class neighborhoods such as Quality Hill and 
Gladstone, while working class neighborhoods began to surround the affluent community 
of Troost.  The growth of industry in the West Bottoms also approached Quality Hill’s 
borders, drastically lowering property values.  Because of this constriction, upper class 
residents began seeking neighborhoods that would allow for expansion while retaining 
exclusivity.  Restrained by the Missouri border to the west, rapid expansion to the east, 
and the Missouri River to the north, land developers began to push south beyond city 
limits.28 
Originally a resident of Quality Hill, Charles Morse spearheaded an elite 
movement south after he and several associates secured 160 acres located between 
Thirty-Fourth and Fortieth Street and bound by Broadway and Oak.  With the help of 
developer Frank Baird, architect Henry Van Brunt, and landscaper George Kessler, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Schirmer, 37-39. 
27 Ibid., 34.  




Morse’s Hyde Park became an instant success; he moved his family there in 1887.  His 
triumph immediately drew the attention of land developers who created similar areas 
such as the Kenwood Addition, plotted just east of Hyde Park between Oak and Holmes.  
The same year Morse subdivided Hyde Park, William Rockhill Nelson began building his 
home between Forty-Fourth and Forty-Seventh Street.  After purchasing the property 
adjacent to his own, Nelson founded Southmoreland, a subdivision smaller than Hyde 
Park but more exclusive.  By 1915, Hyde Park and its surrounding area would house 
nearly two-thirds of Kansas City’s social elite.29  (Refer to Appendix B) 
 
The Parks and Boulevards System 
 
 
William Nelson came to Kansas City in 1880 and founded the Kansas City Star, 
undercutting the prices of Kansas City’s established news sources, the Kansas City 
Journal and the Kansas City Times.  With the help of investors, the Kansas City Star 
soon became Kansas City’s largest news source in both assets and circulation, with 
Nelson placing heavy interest in a growing movement to increase public works and city 
beautification.30  Originally gaining little support from Kansas City’s powerless 
municipal government, lawyer John Cravens drafted a parks and boulevards bill and 
introduced it to the state legislature upon Nelson’s request.  The bill died in committee, 
but he redrafted and introduced it again two years later.  Although Nelson’s second bill 
passed the Missouri Legislature, the Missouri State Supreme Court declared it 
unconstitutional since it required a tax assessed upon Missouri residents who would 
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receive no benefits from the proposed parks and boulevards system.  While Nelson 
pushed for a parks and boulevards system at the state level, Kansas City adopted its first 
home-rule charter in 1889.  Although the new charter recognized the need for city 
beautification and created provisions for a Board of Park Commissioners, it did not 
specify how the city could purchase or use land.  
Working closely with William Nelson and George Kessler, who was a major 
supporter of Nelson’s proposed efforts, lawyer Delbert J. Haff devised a tax system in 
which a special assessment placed on abutting properties would provide the funding for 
park projects. 31  This system ensured that the most affluent parts of the city would 
receive the most benefit.32  Haff submitted his plan as a city charter amendment in 1895.  
With the help of Nelson’s campaign through the Kansas City Star, the proposed tax 
assessment won by a vote of seven to one.  Like Nelson’s prior proposal, the Missouri 
Supreme Court reviewed the new city charter, upholding it at every level of the court 
system.33   
The original park board appointed by Mayor Ben Holmes in 1892 included 
William Van Brunt, Hammerslough, S.B. Armor, and William Glass, all wealthy 
advocates of the park system.34 The park board was to be headed by August Meyer, a 
park advocate who worked closely with Nelson.  Meyer hired George Kessler, also in 
Nelson’s circle, to create the landscape plan that would become the parks and boulevards 
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system.35  Kessler’s original design, proposed in 1893, included Independence, Benton, 
Linwood, Armour, Broadway, and Paseo boulevards, which connected to three proposed 
parks:  North Terrace, West Terrace, and Penn Valley.36  
At the onset of his plan, Kessler argued that the parks and boulevards system 
would “give a permanent character to certain sections of the city” and secure “the best 
and most valuable property.”37  Whereas the boulevard system proposal would retain 
high property values, the park proposal would provide ‘breathing spaces’ for the working 
class.  By appealing to both the elite and working class, Kessler was attempting to secure 
public approval for the assessment of taxes.38  Kessler’s plan also extended well beyond 
the developed urban core, and the city’s limits; it would dictate future patterns of urban 
growth.39 
The parks and boulevards system proposal would not only retain property values 
by placing boulevards around elite areas, but it would also target blighted areas and curb 
the expansion of established racial enclaves.  Although northern elite residential areas, 
such as Quality Hill and Independence Avenue, had lost their status by 1900, the Board 
of Park Commissioners placed parks and boulevards in these areas to stop the 
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encroachment of surrounding slums and maintain preexisting racial enclaves.  One 
example of this was West Terrace Park, which replaced the slums that lay between 
Quality Hill and the West Bottoms. 40  Other racial enclaves such as Belvedere and Hicks 
Hollow, which were restricted by the Missouri River to the north, were now restricted to 
the south by Independence and Admiral Boulevards and to the east by Maple Park.  
Likewise, the Vine Street corridor bordered Paseo Boulevard and Parade Park, the 
construction of which cleared several black occupied homes on Grove and Flora. 41  In 
addition, the creation of Penn Valley Park, which contained roughly three hundred homes 
before its conception, shows similar slum clearance efforts.42  Pleased with the early slum 
clearance efforts of the parks and boulevards system, city leaders then convinced railroad 
companies to abandon Union Depot in the West Bottoms and construct Union Station to 
the southeast.  The construction of Union Station and its surrounding park, meant to stop 
slum encroachment, also displaced a large number of poor residents in the area.43 
Historian William Redding argues that the parks and boulevards system would 
not have been possible if not for the aid of Kansas City’s political bosses such as Mike 
Rose and Jim Pendergast, who supported the system because of the jobs it provided to 
their constituents, including both black and white working class residents.44  Mayor 
Holmes’ successor, James Reed, saw the parks system as an extravagant luxury and 
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opposed it from its conception, appointing a completely new park board in 1900.  
However, the parks and boulevards system continued its rapid growth throughout the 
early 1900s with several of the city’s residents requesting parks in their area.45  This 
became more prevalent with the rise of homeowner’s associations in the 1920s.  Several 
associations would band together to request the placement of parks and boulevards in 
their area to act as a buffer to encroaching properties.  Opposition from white residents, 
who would either not benefit from a proposed park or boulevard or whose land would be 
condemned to build these attractions, often inhibited the efforts of homeowner’s 
associations.  Although the Board of Park Commissioners generally sympathized with the 
intent of most homeowner’s associations, it also acknowledged the opposition and, in 
most cases, denied boulevards requested by homeowner’s associations, stating that 
property owners should handle such matters through mutual agreements.46  
Where the parks and boulevards system did not extend, land developers financed 
and built their own.  The Kenwood Addition, where Arthur Stilwell had built his home in 
1892, is one such example.  Stilwell financed a boulevard that included trees and 
fountains running the length of his property, which he subdivided into lots and later 
sold.47  By 1911, developers and property owners spent over ten million dollars on the 
parks and boulevards system with no expense to the municipality.48  Contemporaries in 
1911 claimed, “the enhancement of land values directly attributed to the establishment of 
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the parks and boulevards to-day exceeds the cost of the entire system.”49  Although the 
parks and boulevards system affected residential patterns until the close of World War II, 
it did not prevent the eventual decline of property values.50 
Because of this degradation of property values and the implementation of Jim 
Crow Laws in Kansas City, real estate agencies began turning away black customers as 
early as 1907.  Through racial steering practices, real estate agents began leading African 
American homebuyers to preexisting racial enclaves such as the Vine Street corridor.51  
Racial steering practices paired with the slum clearance efforts of the Commissioners of 
Parks and Boulevards, which displaced several of Kansas City’s black residents, caused 
an influx of African Americans into areas like Vine Street and Belvidere.  Although these 
racial enclaves were growing in population, the parks and boulevards encompassed and 
restricted them, causing overcrowding and property degradation.  Through the creation of 
the parks and boulevards system, Kansas City’s municipal government bolstered the idea 
among affluent residents that the retention of property value was necessary; it also fueled 
the growth of racial enclaves through its slum clearance and city beautification efforts.  
 
The Board of Public Welfare 
 
 
While the development of the parks and boulevards system steadily grew 
throughout the early 1900s, Kansas City’s municipal government created the Board of 
Public Welfare via ordinance number 4253 on April 14, 1910 to investigate Kansas 
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City’s growing slums, previously recognized by the Board of Commissioners of Parks 
and Boulevards.  This was the first public welfare agency of its kind in any American 
city.  Created in response to striking unemployed laborers who marched on the office of 
the mayor demanding that the city furnish sufficient work to provide them with food and 
lodging, the Board of Public Welfare took the place of the city’s Board of Pardons and 
Paroles.  Although designed to investigate and disperse Kansas City’s slums, the Board 
of Public Welfare focused on unemployment at its onset, spending the majority of its 
early resources on such matters. 52  
Asa Martin’s master’s thesis, “Our Negro Population,” provides the first in depth 
look at the Negro housing conditions that spurred the creation of the Board of Public 
Welfare.  As aforementioned, the creation of the parks and boulevards system, paired 
with racial steering practices, forced many working class residents, mostly African 
Americans, to live in the racial enclaves of Hicks Hollow, Belvedere, or the Vine Street 
corridor.  Because of this overcrowding, Martin states that residents within such enclaves 
paid exorbitant rent for limited housing.  Martin also points out that Kansas City’s blacks, 
as a whole, owned disproportionate amounts of land compared to their white 
counterparts.  While Kansas City, Missouri’s white residents owned $123,037,780 of real 
property, blacks owned 1.4 million as of 1911.53  Furthermore, Martin describes the 
tenant situation within these racial enclaves, stating that the city did little for black 
communities and that “the streets and walks are poorly kept, and no provision whatever is 
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made for parks, playgrounds, or public baths.”54  In addition, half of the houses in the 
districts of Belvidere and Hicks Hollow had no running water, while three-fourths were 
without proper bath or toilet accommodations as of 1911.  Although a city ordinance 
mandated that one toilet or outhouse must exist for every twenty persons, the city made 
no effort to enforce such codes in poor black communities.55  
In addition to the city’s neglectfulness of public works in these communities, 
owners of black occupied properties also neglected their maintenance and upkeep.  
Robert Weaver argues that this, in part, resulted from the high demand for black housing.  
Essentially, property owners within Negro districts did not have to maintain their 
properties in order to attract potential renters.56  Weaver asserts that overcrowding always 
forces degradation regardless of color.  He states, “While there is far from agreement as 
to the initial influence of [blacks] upon property values, there is no doubt of the physical 
decay which occurred.”57 
Although the Board of Public Welfare’s purpose was to investigate and eliminate 
the causes of blight detailed in Martin’s work, it generally worked as an extension to 
preexisting charities, advising them on how to use funds to repel poverty.  These 
organizations included Catholic and Protestant charities, the Young Men’s Christian 
Association, and the National Civic Federation.58  However, most charities that received 
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funding from the Board of Public Welfare, with the exception of the Provident 
Association, did not benefit black residents.  In fact, less than 1% of all charities within 
Kansas City, Missouri had programs for assisting black residents, who comprised 9.5% 
of Kansas City’s population in 1910.  This was in part because of a lack of interest among 
some wealthy black families.59  
This lack of aid to poverty-stricken black communities did not result from a lack 
of knowledge by the Board of Public Welfare.  The board’s Research Bureau conducted 
studies recounted in two reports, the Report on Housing (1912) and Social Prospectus of 
Kansas City (1913).  Although these studies recognized the need for aid among Kansas 
City’s black residents, Kevin Gotham argues that they failed to “distinguish between 
character and environment.”  Instead, “these housing surveys provided ostensibly 
objective and scientific evidence to reinforce emerging prejudice and stereotypes that 
made it appear that blacks were responsible for social problems found in their 
neighborhoods.”60  Sherry Schirmer supports Gotham’s statement, claiming that the 
reports blamed minorities for slum conditions.61  Contemporaries such as Asa Martin also 
similarly claim, “social workers say that no class of people with whom they have to deal 
is so shiftless, indolent, and lazy as the Negro.”62 
In addition to their reports, the Board of Public Welfare’s failure to directly aid 
poverty-stricken blacks stemmed from a few factors.  The first was that only one out of 
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every three black residents of Kansas City paid any form of taxes as of 1910.  Although 
African Americans constituted 9.55 of Kansas City, Missouri’s population, they only 
contributed to .0125% of the city’s total tax revenue when the Board of Public Welfare 
was first established.63  This lack of tax revenue undoubtedly turned welfare efforts away 
from blacks because of their minor contribution to city coffers.  
The Board of Public Welfare’s lack of direct Negro aid was also a result of the 
structure of the board itself.  Since the Board of Pardons and Paroles was essentially 
absorbed into the Board of Public Welfare, a majority of the board’s focus remained on 
parolees.  Divisions of work among the Board of Public Welfare included the 
superintendence office, the Social Service Department, the Department for the Homeless 
and Unemployed, the Welfare Loan Agency, the Municipal Farm, the Women’s 
Reformatory, the Parole Department, the Recreation Department, the Legal Aid Bureau, 
and the Research Bureau.64  From 1910 to 1916, the Board of Public Welfare spent the 
majority of its funds on penal institutions such as the Women’s Reformatory and the 
Municipal Farm, as well as unemployment efforts rather than the diffusion of slums.65  In 
addition, authors such as Jason Roe argue that city council failed to adequately fund the 
Board of Public Welfare, which increasingly fell under municipal control after president 
William Volker lost all influence in 1918.  Roe states, “City politicians gradually gained 
control of the board and allocated its benefits to win political patronage rather than for 
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the purpose of eliminating poverty.”66  Because of these increased efforts to gain political 
patronage, the majority of the Board of Public Welfare’s staff changed with each new 
municipal administration, adding to the instability of welfare programs.67 
It is difficult to make conclusions about the Board of Public Welfare’s efforts 
after Volker left the organization.  Because of interdepartmental differences, annual 
reports stopped after 1918 and few records of communication between the Board of 
Public Welfare and other municipal agencies still exist.68  However, the Board of Public 
Welfare clearly continued to focus on penal institutions.  By 1923, the agency dropped 
both the Social Service Department and the Department for the Homeless and 
Unemployed. 69  As of 1925, the municipal charter of Kansas City simply stated that the 
Commissioner of Social Services “shall manage all penal, corrective, and reformatory 
institutions of the city and shall have charge of all work of the city having to do with 
social services and welfare.”70  Other than specific guidelines governing the management 
of penal institutions, there is no definition or even suggestion on how the Board of Public 
Welfare should implement welfare services.  This, paired with frequent staff changes, 
low funding, and political influence, greatly contributed to the board’s lack of non-penal 
social services.  In 1938, contemporary Walter Matscheck claimed that the Board of 
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Public Welfare ranked among the lowest of city activities, stating, “It (the Board of 





Although racial enclaves preceded the Board of Commissioners of Parks and 
Boulevards and the Board of Public Welfare, the establishment of these organizations 
drove working class families, primarily black, into these communities, which became 
overcrowded and increasingly restricted.  While the parks and boulevards system cleared 
slums, displacing many black residents, racial steering led them into established black 
neighborhoods.  Board of Park Commissioners efforts to secure property values paired 
with Board of Public Welfare reports helped create a stereotype that would flourish in the 
1920s and endure for many decades.  Although the Board of Public Welfare attempted to 
aid some working class citizens, the charities that produced those limited efforts mainly 
worked to benefit white communities. 
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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Starting at the turn of the century, most Midwestern cities experienced a rapid 
growth in black population.  Kansas City, Missouri was no exception to this trend, 
experiencing a growth from 17,567 black residents in 1900 to 23,566 in 1910 and 30,719 
in 1920.72  In part, the Great Migration of southern and rural blacks into northern and 
midwestern cities caused this rapid growth.  Rising tensions within the southern 
sharecropping system, agricultural unemployment resulting from boll weevil infestations, 
and a loss of industrial laborers in the northern states during World War I all contributed 
to the migration.73  This influx of black residents, paired with rising racial tensions 
through the implementation Jim Crow laws and the fear of a loss in property values 
attributed to growing racial enclaves, caused neighborhoods within Kansas City to search 
for additional ways to exclude black residents.  This manifested in racially restrictive 
covenants and deed restrictions within Kansas City’s neighborhoods, which remained 
intact until the Fair Housing Act of 1968 despite the Supreme Court’s 1948 decision 
declaring restrictive covenants unenforceable.   
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Before restrictive covenants became the primary form of residential segregation, 
many major American cities used methods such as harassment, racial zoning, and 
nuisance laws to control racial movement.  During the first few decades of the twentieth 
century, Kansas City saw fewer cases of physical harassment as a means to exclude black 
residents from its neighborhoods than most major cities.  Nevertheless, physical 
harassment did occur, mainly in the form of bombings.  In one instance, bombers 
destroyed seven black homes on Montgall Avenue between April 1910 and November 
1911.74  Such bombings became common in Kansas City throughout the early decades of 
the twentieth century.  The Kansas City Call reports that one black resident, H.M. 
Williams, who moved into an all-white neighborhood was visited by “a delegation of 
white men who told him (Williams) he would have to move or suffer consequences.”75  
One month after these threats, the perpetrators followed through with their plan and 
bombed Williams’ home.76  Although these bombings certainly steered African 
Americans away from such neighborhoods, they also steered white property buyers away 
from neighborhoods where bombings damaged adjacent properties, making harassment 
an unattractive form of segregation.   
The downfall of harassment efforts within Kansas City coincides with the appeal 
of said efforts.  Although harassment is cheap and requires little coordination with others, 
it is usually ineffective “without the approbation or at least acquiescence of other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Meyer, 20. 
75 “Home Owners Dared to Live in House at Park and 21st,” Kansas City Call, April 29, 
1922.  
76 “Williams’ Home Blown Up A Month after Promised of Destruction,” Kansas City 




neighbors” that can undermine acts of harassment.77  In the case of H.M. Williams, the 
Kansas City Call reports that harassment attempts did not sway Williams, who continued 
to occupy his residence with the support of fellow community members.78  
Kansas City, Missouri never enacted nuisance laws or racial zoning efforts.  
Nuisance laws require neighbors to consider their surrounding neighbors, restricting them 
from harming neighborhood cohesion:  a modern example of a nuisance law would 
include noise ordinances.  In Fallon v. Schilling (1883), the Kansas Supreme Court 
declared that property owners could consider race as a nuisance; in that case, the plaintiff 
sued the adjacent property owner for renting to Negroes.  Although the Fallon v. 
Schilling decision became the norm in most state courts, historians Richard Brooks and 
Carol Rose argue that municipalities rarely ever used nuisance laws to exclude race.79  
Racial zoning laws came under serious consideration after Alderman C.J. Gilman 
proposed a city ordinance that would restrict blacks from racially homogeneous white 
neighborhoods in 1911.  Gilman’s proposal passed in the lower chamber of city council, 
yet the upper chamber overturned it because of a Maryland Supreme Court decision that 
ruled against the Baltimore ordinance on which Gilman had based his proposal. 80  Steven 
Meyer argues that the emerging Prendergast machine, representing the Negro populated 
West Bottoms, could have also influenced Kansas City’s decision to not implement racial 
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zoning laws.81  By 1917, the Supreme Court decision of Buchanan V. Warley ruled racial 






Although racial zoning or nuisance laws were not a factor in the restriction of 
Kansas City’s growing African American population, blacks continued to populate the 
urban core of Kansas City while white residents continued to migrate south.  A young 
land developer named J.C. Nichols now headed this southern migration, originally led by 
Charles Morse.  Nichols acquired one thousand acres of land, known as the country club 
district, south of the Morse’s Hyde Park in 1908 after gaining financial backing from 
Hugh Ward and William Kemper, head of the Commerce Trust Company.  Nichols 
lobbied successfully for city annexation of his property, therefore providing access to city 
maintained water, sewer, and streets.  Following the work of his predecessors, Nichols 
plotted Sunset Hill west of the existing Kansas City Country Club, along Brush Creek, 
for Kansas City’s elite and Mission Hills, directly west of Sunset Hill, in Kansas City, 
Kansas.83  Although most of Kansas City’s affluent suburbs were within Missouri, 
Kansas City, Kansas’s cheap land provided for the development of middle-class 
subdivisions including: Mission Woods, Fairway, and Prairie Village.84  
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To protect Sunset Hill from the encroachment of Negroes and declining property 
values, Nichols used a series of screens that would surround his elite property.  Drawing 
off the contemporary trend of using parks and boulevards as racial barriers, Nichols 
successfully lobbied to extend a boulevard from Penn Valley Park to Sunset Hill and 
created two boulevards of his own:  Brookside Boulevard, bordering the east of Sunset 
Hill, and Ward Parkway, through his property’s center.85  To get the city to participate in 
the construction of boulevards that would connect his property to the existing boulevards 
system and draw potential buyers, Nichols offered to pay for all boulevard construction.  
However, residents paid for such boulevards indirectly through higher land prices.86  
In addition to these boulevards, Nichols created Mission Hills Country Club to the 
north of his property and similar country clubs to the west and south.  These spacious 
properties completely encompassed Sunset Hill since the existing Kansas City Country 
Club already bordered to the east.  The Kansas City Country Club would later come up 
for sale in 1922 with the speculation that community builders would clear it for suburban 
housing.  Fearing an adjoining property and the loss of a land barrier to the east, Nichols 
promptly foresaw the purchase of the Kansas City Country Club that later became Jacob 
L. Loose Memorial Park.87  In addition to Mission Hills Country Club to the north, 
Nichols created the Country Club Plaza in 1923.  Although the automobile allowed 
Sunset Hill’s southern location, Nichols feared that its remoteness from the urban core 
might limit its appeal.  To combat this, Nichols purchased forty acres where Mill Creek 
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Parkway met both Brookside Boulevard and Ward Parkway to create the Country Club 
Plaza, a shopping district that would be as upscale as its clientele would be.88  
Mission Hills and Sunset Hill were not only protected from encroaching 
properties via the use of land, but also by deed restrictions governing how the land could 
be used, the types of buildings to be constructed, and to whom these properties could be 
rented or sold.89  Although property restrictions meant to exclude race existed in Kansas 
City prior to Nichols, he amended the application of these restrictions in Kansas City’s 
communities in 1914 when he instituted a clause within his Mission Hills deeds that 
automatically renewed deed restrictions unless the majority of landowners took action to 
revoke them.  Originally filed for twenty-five years, these restrictions renewed upon 
expiration.  Before this, most deed restrictions on properties lasted for ten to twenty-five 
years, at which time they were no longer effective.90  In addition to agreeing to deed 
restrictions before the purchase of land, Nichols required purchasers to join the Mission 
Hills Homes Company, the first true homeowners association founded by Nichols.91  
The role of the homeowners association was to enforce deed restrictions, 
including racial restrictions, by fines or means of legal action.  To combat the transfer of 
properties to Negroes and promote racially homogeneous neighborhoods, later efforts by 
homeowners associations included purchasing land from preexisting black residents or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Ibid., 85.  
89 Worley, 70. 
90 Ibid., 129-30.  




acquiring vacant homes so that the association could control land sales.92  Nichols was 
the first to back his deed restrictions via a homeowners association.93  He soon added 
structured homeowners associations to Sunset Hill via the Country Club District Homes 
Association, and Armour Hills, a middle class subdivision south of the Country Club 
District.94  Deed restrictions, backed by a homeowners association, became one of 
Nichols' biggest draws.  By 1930, Sunset Hill and Mission Hills housed 59% of Kansas 
City’s elite.  In 1930, 90% of Kansas City’s elite resided in Hyde Park, Southmoreland, 
Sunset Hill, and Mission Hills, all of which employed deed restrictions.95  The Missouri 
Supreme Court upheld restrictions prohibiting the sale, lease, or rental of property to 
blacks in 1918.96  Similarly, in the case of Corrigan V. Buckley (1926), the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that, “the individual citizen, whether he be black or white, may 
refuse to sell or lease his property to any particular individual or class of individuals.”97 
The success of innovation in the enforcement of deed restrictions, paired with the 
decisions of both the U.S. and Missouri supreme courts, caused most Kansas City land 
developers to employ restrictions of their own.  In addition to land developers writing 
restrictions into original deeds, preexisting Kansas City neighborhoods also attempted to 
alter their deeds or create homeowners associations to restrict blacks.  In 1923, the 
Southeast Home Protective Association (SHPA) announced its presence just south of the 
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predominantly black eastside and vowed to protect the property values of the preexisting 
houses between Thirteenth and Twentieth Street, and Euclid Avenue to Benton 
Boulevard.  Although the SHPA made provisions for neighborhood maintenance and 
beautification, its primary purpose was to “prevent the encroachment of Negroes by 
shunning property owners, real estate agents, and lenders that enabled African Americans 
to move into the area.”98  To accomplish this goal, the SHPA pressured its residents to 
enter covenants that would legally restrict blacks from purchasing homes.  Unlike 
Nichols’ properties, the original deeds did not contain those restrictions.  Instead, the 
property owner had to affix a restriction at the registrar’s office or get a notarized 
agreement with the homeowners association.99  Although restrictive covenants like these 
were not bound to an original deed, “they were still legally enforceable if the proper 
methods had been taken to register with the city government” - usually done by means of 
a “junction.”100  The Kansas City Call stated, “What the city council and state legislatures 
cannot do, that is segregate blacks and whites, a notary with a seal can do, or at least has 
made a show of in Kansas City.”101  
Other land developers tried to appeal to Kansas City’s black residents by offering 
them similar restrictive covenants.  For example, in 1941 city council approved Wirtham 
Realty Company’s plan to construct an all-black community that was restricted via a 
covenant for thirty years.  Initially building twenty-five dwellings, then later adding an 
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additional forty-six homes, Wirtham Reality Company’s all black subdivision was 
located around Twenty-fifth Street and Paseo, the heart of the Negro community.102  
Since most of Kansas City’s black residents did not fear living in racially mixed 
neighborhoods, it is reasonable to assume that efforts by real estate agents to create 
restricted black neighborhoods were only meager attempts to turn a profit.  
Aside from the fact that restrictive covenants were fueled by the fear of 
diminishing property values and growing racial tensions, both local and national real 
estate boards pushed for racial restrictions, while the federal government’s creation of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 and Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 
1934 contributed to their growth.  By 1924, the National Association of Real Estate 
Brokers (NAREB) began to endorse racial steering, incorporating such practices into 
their guidelines.  Three years later, in 1927, the NAREB wrote a standard restrictive 
covenant document that encouraged homeowners associations to enforce such 
covenants.103  Michael Jones-Corra argues that most realtors found it in their interest to 
follow national guidelines since the NAREB and Kansas City’s local real estate board 
often expelled or ostracized members that did not follow them.  The result was a loss of 
networking and information “critical to the practice of the real estate broker.”104  After 
the NAREB endorsed restrictive covenants in 1927, Kansas City neighborhoods gained 
the aid of the Kansas City Real Estate Board in applying for restrictive covenants.  At the 
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time, Kansas City’s realtors also encouraged the use of posters and public advertisements 
to steer black residents away from white communities.105 
During the 1920s, the NAREB held considerable power to influence real estate 
law through lobbying efforts.  This influence resulted in A Standard City Planning 
Enabling Act, which helped legitimize public control of subdivision development.  
During the Great Depression, home foreclosure peaked while new constructions and sales 
decreased, leading the federal government to become actively involved in the real estate 
industry.  Seeking to rejuvenate the home and community building industry, the federal 
government thus began to work with the NAREB to form a plan that would stabilize and 
protect property values while increasing consumer demand.  Real estate brokers and 
mortgage bankers both pushed for a federally regulated home financing system where 
mortgages would consist of a low down payment and a long-term pay period, resulting in 
the creation of the Federal Housing Administration in 1932 and the Housing Act of 
1934.106 
In response to the Great Depression, the FHA created the Home Owners Loan 
Corporation (1933) to provide advances to lending institutions as well as credit 
extensions to borrowers with defaulted mortgages.107  In order to create a new mortgage 
system, the FHA relied on HOLC to assign the ratings for the creditworthiness of 
housing.  Instead of giving a credit score to an individual person, HOLC assigned whole 
neighborhoods a credit score based on their value, which gave neighborhoods a rating 
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from A to D and placed priority on the retention of land values. 108  While racially 
homogeneous white neighborhoods received the highest credit rating, minority 
neighborhoods received the lowest.  This meant that whites wishing to buy homes in 
racially mixed neighborhoods could not receive FHA benefits.109  Similarly, blacks living 
in racially mixed, or all-black neighborhoods, were generally ineligible for FHA home 
loans.  
To justify the use of this new system, the Federal Housing Act of 1934 simply 
stated that racially homogeneous neighborhoods led to stability, providing further legal 
sanction for restrictive covenants.110  Not only did FHA insured loans require a high 
rating through the HOLC system, they also required new housing to meet strict property 
standards in design, building materials, appraisals, and the location of the building site.  
Since the FHA required minimum property standards, community builders now had the 
perfect means for real estate control. 
Before the creation of the FHA, most home loans required one-third down 
payment and short payment durations of five to seven years.  New FHA laws only 
required a 20% down payment and a thirty-year fixed mortgage.111  Federally insured 
loans were most likely to be granted within subdivisions where “land use regulations 
would guarantee ‘relative economic stability’ and ‘protection against adverse 
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influences.”112  Key members of the real estate and banking industry who “dominated the 
congressional hearings on the 1934 Housing Act and were directly involved in drafting 
the final housing legislation” primarily directed FHA policy.113  J.C. Nichols and other 
community builders, who could now secure government subsidies, benefited the most.  
FHA policies also encouraged community builders to implement restrictive covenants 
and homeowners associations in order to attract homebuyers that sought low down 
payments and long-term mortgages.  The Federal Housing Administration’s 1938 
Underwriting Manual stated, “If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that 
properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes.”114  
Between 1934 and 1962, the FHA insured roughly 77,000 homes in the Kansas 
City area, with only 1% of its insured mortgages going to black families.115  The FHA’s 
efforts to support racially homogeneous neighborhoods continued until the passage of the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968.  Richard Brooks and Carol Rose state, “As late as 1962, in a 
U.S. Civil Rights Commission report on the Washington housing market, the authors 
complained that the FHA was simply passive about real estate professionals’ measures to 
perpetuate neighborhood segregation.”116 
Kevin Gotham claims that, “In Kansas City, the origin of racially segregated 
neighborhoods was not the foreordained consequence of decades of an unchanging racial 
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prejudice or overt discrimination by ordinary white residents, instead discriminatory acts 
were cultivated and disseminated through the organized efforts of elite real estate 
interests, community builders, and homeowners associations.”117  Although this may be 
the case, restrictive covenants failed to completely stem the growth of black enclaves into 
white neighborhoods.  Real estate blockbusting efforts, which began in 1922, stood in the 
way.  Realtor Fortune Weaver was among the first to profit from panic selling by offering 
to pay cash for houses in lots of twenty-five.  Other realtors sold single properties within 
white neighborhoods to blacks in hopes that white residents might then sell their 
properties at a discount.  Real estate agents then sold these properties at inflated prices to 
blacks attempting to leave the slums.  Blockbusting attempts also succeeded in locations 
where residents used physical harassment to rid encroaching blacks.  As demonstrated by 
several bombing and arson cases that occurred during blockbusting attempts east of the 
Vine Street corridor, bombing attempts affected neighboring white residents as much as 
their targeted audience.118  
In 1923, neighbors sued one Kansas City property owner for breaking his 
restrictive covenant and selling to a black family.  The case, unprecedented in Missouri, 
made it to the Missouri Supreme Court, which ruled that covenants were unenforceable in 
neighborhoods where the conditions of said covenant had already been broken.119  
Because of this ruling, a restrictive covenant could only be effective if all residents 
abided by their contract, or if the homeowners association could afford to buy housing 
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from residents who wished to move.  As mentioned earlier, community builders such as 
J.C. Nichols had self-perpetuating restrictions that required a majority vote to be 
changed.  If a member broke this restriction, he would be in breach of his private 
contract, established as enforceable in Corrigan V. Buckley.120  Nevertheless, restrictive 
covenants formed in existing neighborhoods ran the risk of having community members 
who were unwilling to attach restrictions to their deeds or members who could remove 
restrictions via an affidavit. 
Homeowners associations created in preexisting developments had a higher risk 
of encroaching black neighborhoods than their suburban counterparts did because 
preexisting homes or structures and a lack of capital prevented the construction of buffer 
zones.  Although several homeowners associations often banded together to request the 
construction of parks and boulevards on the edges of their community, the Board of Parks 
Commissioners rarely acted upon such requests.  Parks and boulevards proposed by 
homeowners associations often met opposition from white residents who had to pay 
assessments without benefitting from the park as well as those whose land might be 
condemned for park use.  Linwood Improvement Association’s (LIA) request to condemn 
the area between Troost and Spring Valley parks to create a solid barrier to the north is 
one such example.  Although the Board of Park Commissioners sympathized with LIA’s 
cause, it concluded that it “could not afford to build a park that would serve as nothing 
but a ‘deadline’ to black movement.”121  Although the Board of Park Commissioners 
stated that a new park’s cost did not justify a racial buffer, Sherry Schirmer argues that 
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opposition had forced the park board’s conclusion.  That opposition came from small-
property owners who were unwilling to pay a park assessment, white residents who 
would lose their homes to park construction, and residents who believed that Linwood 
would not retain property value regardless of racial buffers because of middle class 
movement south and the age of its homes.122 
 
Shelly v. Kraemer 
 
 
An official ruling on the legality of restrictive covenants did not emerge until the 
mid-1940s.  In 1945, an African American St. Louis resident, J.D. Shelley, bought a 
house bound by a racially restrictive covenant.  Backed by a homeowners association and 
the St. Louis Real Estate Exchange, neighbors Louis and Fern Kraemer filed a lawsuit 
against Shelley for purchasing a home within a restricted neighborhood.  In response, 
Shelley drew support of black real estate brokers to pursue the case.  Meanwhile, African 
Americans Orsel and Minnie McGhee, who were facing a similar lawsuit in Detroit, 
sought the aid of the NAACP.  Both the Missouri and Michigan Supreme Courts upheld 
the legality of restrictive covenants, but the combined efforts of Shelley and McGhee 
forced the case to the United States Supreme Court. 123  The resulting case, Shelley v. 
Kraemer (1948), reversed the decisions of the state courts and ruled that based on the 
fourteenth amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, courts could not enforce racially 
restrictive covenants.124  However, brokers and lawyers supported the continuance of 
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racially restrictive covenants, stating that these covenants were still legal if voluntarily 
followed.125 
Although Shelley v. Kraemer ruled racially restrictive covenants unenforceable, 
realtors, community builders, banks, and government agencies still encouraged 
restrictions governing the race of potential homebuyers.126  Kansas City, Missouri, which 
recorded 1,243 racially restrictive covenants between 1948 and 1960, was no exception.  
Jackson County recorded 957 of these covenants.  The fact that this same county only 
recorded 148 restrictive covenants prior to the Shelley v. Kraemer ruling shows that 
restrictive covenants not only persisted Shelley v. Kraemer, but they became more 
prevalent in some areas.127   
One method of maintaining racially restrictive covenants after 1948 was to 
rewrite covenant agreements so that they did not included race-based language.  New 
agreements may have required a certain number of neighbors to “approve” of a property 
buyer before a sale was finalized.  Other covenant agreements gave the homeowners 
association the ability to vote on incumbent neighbors.128  Similarly, while the federal 
government forced the FHA to remove any reference to racial covenants from their 
underwriting manual, the agency continued to encourage methods of maintaining 
homogeneous neighborhoods.129  
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After Shelley v. Kraemer, several states held court hearings against homeowners 
who violated racially restrictive agreements via damage actions.  Although most states 
denied damage claims, Missouri upheld them.130  The Missouri Supreme Court supported 
Missouri residents who sought damage claims because it believed that minorities lowered 
property values.  It asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment held no stance on private 
conduct, and therefore, “these contracts could be enforced by law by awarding damages, 
for that remedy would not injure the right of Negroes to obtain property under equal 
conditions as whites.”131  The case of Barrow v. Jackson (1953) later ruled damage 
claims granted to restrictive covenants unenforceable.132 
Although cases such as Shelley v. Kraemer and Barrow v. Jackson created the 
opportunity for African Americans to move outside of racial enclaves, Richard Brooks 
and Carol Rose argue that most minorities did not wish to become “pioneers” because of 
the threat of violence and the cost of legal action.133  The use of restrictive covenants had 
also enforced social norms that made white residents reluctant to sell their homes to 
blacks and further made blacks reluctant to buy them.  Brooks states, “Blacks were as 
discouraged by unenforceable covenants as segregationists were emboldened by 
them.”134  Although blockbusting - placing black residents in previously all white 
neighborhoods - became increasingly common after 1948, most whites moved from 
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busted neighborhoods, and therefore, these neighborhoods became solely populated by 
minorities.135  
 
Machine Politics and Blockbusting 
 
 
It is unclear why the municipal government of Kansas City did not take any action 
against blockbusting or restrictive covenants during the first half of the twentieth century.  
Michael Jones-Corra argues that the lack of municipal involvement often resulted from 
the simple fact that municipal agencies saw no need for intervention, stating, 
“Metropolitan governments often had neither the inclination nor the resources to address 
the structural issues underlying civil disturbances.”136  Although Kansas City, Missouri’s 
municipal government may have not have been inclined to curb these forms of housing 
segregation, Sherry Schirmer and William Redding argue that city leaders, particularly 
Tom Pendergast, had the power to lower color barriers.  Sherry Schirmer states, “A 
timely word from Tom Pendergast could have righted matters, but as long as African 
Americans continued to give him their votes, the boss had scant reason to challenge the 
prejudices of his white constituents on their behalf.”137  
Pendergast, who certainly held the power to implement racial changes within 
Kansas City, vowed to aid the Negro community.  Although he attempted to do so, 
William Redding, Van William Hutchison, and Lyle Dorsett argue that his efforts were 
meager attempts to retain black voters, who had become increasingly Democratic in the 
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early 1900s.  A local black news source, The Rising Sun, pushed some black voters to the 
Democratic Party after it condemned the Republican Party for Roosevelt’s discharge of 
black soldiers at Brownsville and the “lily-white” movement behind Taft’s 1908 
nomination.  In addition to the black voters becoming increasing Democratic, blacks 
tended to lean toward machine Democrats rather than anti-boss independents, who used 
race-baiting political maneuvers.  This secured the black vote for Pendergast as he 
became one of Kansas City’s most powerful bosses.138  
Most of Pendergast’s attempts to improve the African American community fell 
short of his intentions.  If anything, he only fueled racial stereotypes.  His major 
contribution to the black community came after 1925, when the Missouri Supreme Court 
declared it unconstitutional to require a city to fund a police department without having 
direct control over it.  This resulted in a Pendergast-led purge of the Kansas City Police 
Department.  Although this did lower police brutality rates against the black community, 
Pendergast’s main reason for the purge was to gain control over Kansas City’s vice 
trade.139  He was not new to the vice trade in 1925; his older brother, First Ward 
Alderman Jim Pendergast, had also promoted gambling in Kansas City’s West Bottoms 
and north end throughout the 1890s.140  
Growing concerns over Kansas City’s vice trade led the Pendergast-controlled 
Board of Police Commissioners to enact a policy of vice containment designed to keep 
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vice at Kansas City’s north end, within the Vine Street racial enclave and away from 
white middle class and affluent neighborhoods.  Although some white moral crusaders 
moved to eradicate Kansas City’s vice trade entirely, groups such as the Society for the 
Suppression of Commercialized Vice (SFSCV) ultimately failed in their efforts.  The 
SFSCV did manage to sue Kansas City’s brothels as public nuisances, only to have the 
case thrown out by the Missouri Supreme Court.141  In its early stages, some blacks also 
opposed the restraint of the vice trade to the Vine Street corridor, yet most supported the 
vice trade because it provided jobs.142  Unfortunately, that confinement fueled growing 
racial stereotypes via a self-fulfilling prophecy of unlawful behavior.  Historian James 
Shortridge also argues that the city’s decision to place a garbage reduction plant near the 
black commercial district in 1926 influenced the stereotype that poor sanitation could be 
associated with African Americans.143  
Outside of the vice trade, Pendergast provided municipal work for African 
Americans.  Under his purview, the number of blacks on the city’s payroll had risen from 
eighty-nine in 1924 to 438 in 1938.  However, Sherry Schirmer argues that this increase 
was not an effort to provide work for Kansas City blacks but instead a weak effort to 
retain black votes.144  During Pendergast’s reign, his organization also pledged to 
improve healthcare within the black community.  Accordingly, Kansas City’s Department 
of Hygiene and Communicable Diseases announced the plans for a new Negro hospital 
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on Hospital Hill next to the leading white hospitals.  Knowing that some elites would 
protest the location of the hospital, City Manager Henry McElroy stalled plans for two 
years before he gave his approval.  General Hospital No. 2 opened in February, 1930 as 
the most up-to-date black hospital in the United States.  Although well equipped, political 
battles within the Pendergast organization caused staffing problems at the hospital, and 
General Hospital No. 2 became a public embarrassment.  The public believed that its 
association with blacks caused the hospital’s failure.145  
Although William Redding, Van William Hutchison, and Lyle Dorsett argue that 
Pendergast only aided blacks to gain their votes, he did create more African American 
jobs and the nation’s best-equipped Negro hospital.  As a direct consequence of the city’s 
effort to confine the vice trade to Negro districts and the lack of care for its Negro 
facilities, Pendergast’s policies led to increased racial stereotypes.  Since the Pendergast 
machine relied so heavily on both black and white votes and patronage, Pendergast did 
try to aid Negroes in some ways, but he would not dare to make a bold risk that would 
alienate his white patrons by trying to rid Kansas City of racial barriers such as restrictive 
covenants.  
Like Pendergast, Harry Truman, a member of the Pendergast machine, enjoyed 
the support of black voters in local elections.  Although Truman backed anti-lynching 
laws and the anti-discrimination amendment to the Selective Service Act, Truman, like 
Pendergast, made it clear that he did not wish to foster social equality for blacks.146  As 
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president, Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights did support FHA’s abandonment of 
racial covenants from their doctrine, yet it did nothing when those practices continued.147 
The strong involvement of realtors and community builders in Kansas City 
politics also explains why Kansas City’s municipal government did not make a move to 
dampen racially restrictive covenants.  Kansas City’s largest community builder and 
innovator of deed restrictions, J.C. Nichols, held considerable power to influence 
municipal policy.  He served on municipal committees such as the Committee of One 
Hundred, selected to build the Liberty Memorial.  Nichols was also active in city water 
projects, founding and heading the Committee of Twenty-five, which pushed for a larger 
water facility by enlisting the support of the Chamber of Commerce and campaigning for 
the passage of water bonds in 1921.148  In addition, Nichols served as the president of the 
Kansas City Art Institute from 1920-27, the chair of the public building committee in 
1931, and as a member of the school board from 1918-26.149  He and his company also 
made considerable land gifts to the city.  In 1925, Nichols donated a large fountain on the 
corner of Meyer Boulevard and Ward Parkway.150  
In addition to holding several municipal and influential positions, authors Robert 
and Brad Pearson argue that Nichols and Pendergast were friends.  When Nichols’ wife, 
Jessie, felt that Kansas City needed a clean milk ordinance but could not get the city to 
consider her proposal, J.C. Nichols simply went to Pendergast’s office to discuss the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Vose, 225.  
148Pearson and Pearson, 82. 
149 Ibid., 180.  




matter.  Jessie’s proposed ordinance passed at the next city council meeting.151  This 
incident, although small, shows the influence that J.C. Nichols had over Tom Pendergast, 
a man who held nearly total control over Kansas City’s municipal government.  
Historians such as William Redding also argue that Kansas City’s 1925 home rule 
charter catered to business and real estate interests through patronage, especially under 
Pendergast.152  Because of the patronage system, civic organizations held little influence 
over Pendergast’s policies.  Contemporaries report that although organizations such as 
the Civic Research Institute wished to increase decentralization efforts within Negro 
communities, such organizations had “lost most of their ability to secure direct results in 
improved procedures, the [Civic Research] Institute having become, as far as city affairs 







Restrictive covenants and their adjoining homeowners associations became a 
primary means of segregating black and white residents within Kansas City’s real estate 
market during the first half of the twentieth century.  Although Kansas City’s political 
bosses held the power to limit racial steering within the real estate industry, they placed 
few limits on such practices.  Kansas City’s most powerful boss, Tom Pendergast, vowed 
to aid Negroes, yet his efforts were only meant to secure black voters who were already 
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leaning toward his machine.  Moreover, bosses such as Pendergast fueled racial 
stereotypes through their support of the vice trade.  Meanwhile, the federal government’s 
New Deal policies found in the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 and the Federal 
Housing administration of 1934 gave municipal governments little reason to pursue anti-
segregation efforts within housing.  Although Shelley v. Kraemer ruled restrictive 
covenants unenforceable in 1948, the federal and local real estate industry supported 
restrictive covenants and racially homogeneous neighborhoods, contributing to the 
continuance of housing segregation within Kansas City.  Only with the passage of the 















URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AND THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS 
 
 
After the passage of the Federal Housing Act of 1934, the National Association of 
Real Estate Brokers began to lobby for state action that would allow private enterprise the 
ability to clear slum areas within cities since these areas negatively affected adjacent 
property values.  By 1936, the National Association of Real Estate Brokers’ Committee 
on Housing publicly suggested that local governments should have the ability to acquire 
and demolish slum properties, selling them back to private firms for reconstruction.  As 
lobbying efforts continued, the NAREB formed the Urban Land Institute (ULI) in 1939, 
headed by Kansas City’s J.C. Nichols, to research the cause and effect of urban blight in 
hopes of creating policy directed towards the revitalization of the urban core. 154 
As early as 1940, members of Kansas City’s Municipal Government, such as City 
Planner Harland Bartholomew, spoke out against decentralization and the effects that it 
had on the financial structure of the city.  He condemned FHA policy, which he saw as 
the abandonment of blighted areas.  Perry Cookingham, City Manager from 1940-1959, 
shared Bartholomew’s views, stating that decentralization had adverse effects on Kansas 
City’s business district.  In addition to municipal support, Kansas City’s business and real 
estate elites linked to downtown interests openly endorsed the NAREB policy that would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




create partnerships between municipal and private efforts to reverse urban decay and the 
spread of suburbs.  Following trends set by the NAREB, the Kansas City Realtor, the 
official publication of the Kansas City, Missouri Real Estate Board, published articles 
warning fellow realtors about the effects that decentralization and slum properties had on 
urban property values. Although the private sector previously took on the task of clearing 
slums within Kansas City, it sought the support of the municipal government, since most 
land developers and realtors held no legal right to acquire and clear slum properties and 
lacked the means of financing large-scale revitalization.  Since most cities did not possess 
the capital or legal right to clear slums, many turned to public housing as a means to 
redevelop the urban core.155 
 
The Creation of Public Housing 
 
 
Public housing found its origins with progressive activists, who wished to replace 
blighted areas with publicly owned and operated housing.  Since progressives sought 
increased urban renewal, Edward Goetz states, “Public housing for those in the 
Progressive movement was therefore meant to eliminate the adverse conditions of the 
slum and to provide much needed affordable housing for the neediest.”156  The 
progressive Modern Housing Association called for government-subsidized housing for 
the working class, including union based organizations and cooperatives.  
The Federal Emergency Relief Act (1933) allowed the federal government to 
make loans to limited-dividend partners for the construction of low-income housing.  
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Because of a lack of private interest, the guidelines for the program (later placed under 
the Public Works Administration) changed in 1934 to allow the federal government to 
construct public housing on cleared slum areas.  In United States v. Certain Land in the 
City of Louisville (1935), the Supreme Court ruled the federal government’s use of 
eminent domain for slum clearance unconstitutional.  Subsequently, the Roosevelt 
administration encouraged states to enable legislation allowing for slum clearance and 
public housing construction.  Advocates for public housing thus focused their efforts on a 
federal program that would operate through state-chartered agencies. 157 
Although legislative efforts to establish a permanent housing program continued 
throughout the mid-1930s, Progressive reformers and modern housing supporters backed 
competing bills that the Department of Interior and the Department of Commerce 
generally opposed.158  Because of these opposing views, new housing legislation did not 
pass until the Housing Act of 1937, which gave localities the ability to create housing 
authorities with the power of eminent domain.159  Stipulations within the 1937 housing 
legislation not only limited the income of public housing tenants and the cost of housing 
construction, but it also mandated that a substandard or slum unit must be destroyed for 
every unit of public housing built in order to keep public housing efforts from interfering 
with the private market.  Overall, the plan was that communities would build public 
housing on land that otherwise held little value.  
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Implementation of Public Housing in Kansas City 
 
Although Kansas City could have applied for slum clearance funds as early as 
1939 under state bill H.B. 6, Pendergast’s City Manager Henry McElroy wished to be 
excluded from any urban renewal efforts, making Kansas City one of the few major cities 
that did not participate in public housing during the late 1930s.160  Unlike McElroy, Perry 
Cookingham, McElroy’s successor, heavily supported urban renewal efforts and strongly 
sponsored the creation of the Housing Authority of Kansas City (HAKC), established 
July 14, 1941 via city ordinance.161  Plans for public housing, such as the proposed Vine-
Paseo Homes that would be in the heart of the Vine Street corridor between Twenty-fifth 
and Twenty-Seventh Street, were in progress within Kansas City by late 1941.  Although 
HAKC sought to construct public housing immediately, the Federal Public Housing 
Administration (FPHA) forced HAKC to postpone operations for the duration of World 
War II because of restrictions placed upon the use of building materials.162  In November 
of 1942, HAKC voted to suspend operations on Public Law 412.163 
Although HAKC suspended its operations for the duration of World War II, 
Kansas City Missouri’s municipal government continued its push for public housing, 
creating its first low-income housing units under the 1943 HOLC conversion program 
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that allowed government subsidies and secured loans for the conversion of private 
buildings into cheap apartments.  Within the first year of the program, the Kansas City 
Plan Commission converted eight buildings into a hundred and sixty-two units while the 
private sector converted eleven buildings into eighty-four units.164  Although these efforts 
added much-needed Negro housing within Kansas City, revitalized units were primarily 
located downtown along Troost or Paseo, which housed 29,000 of Kansas City’s 41,574 
Negroes in 1940, adding more black families to the overpopulated Troost-Paseo 
district.165  Later outlined in Section 220 of the National Housing Act, FHA sponsored 
conversion programs continued throughout the mid-twentieth century, the era during 
which historian Raymond Schwartz argues that most cities sold land to private developers 
who then applied for FHA assistance.166  Although this may be the case in other 
American cities, Kansas City’s private sector made no strong efforts to engage in 
rehabilitation because of its high failure rates and lack of money-making potential.  
Instead, urban renewal programs in Kansas City bought and revitalized buildings under 
HAKC; continually placing rehabilitated housing in the inner city where urban renewal 
efforts were concentrated.167  
During HAKC’s suspended operations, conflict between public housing advocates 
and real estate interests manifested itself within Kansas City.  While real estate elites 
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argued that the Housing Act of 1937 only granted housing authorities the right to clear 
slums for private redevelopment, Progressive supporters believed that government 
organizations would build and maintain the housing.168  Although reactivated March 11, 
1946 to provide emergency housing for returning veterans, debates over public housing at 
the national, state, and local level hindered HAKC from providing any form of housing 
until 1949.  In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court struggled to rule on whether public 
housing operations were charitable bodies and therefore tax-exempt.  Because of this 
delay and pressures by NAREB and Progressive lobbyists, Missouri failed to amend its 
enabling act for public housing operations until 1951.169  Kevin Gotham argues that the 
NAREB’s fear of competing with government programs within the real estate market 
caused these debates between the NAREB and federal housing advocates.  In addition, 
the debates resulted from the NAREB perception of “public housing as the opening 
wedge of a campaign to attack housing discrimination, reduce class and racial residential 
segregation, and in effect, challenge the institutional foundations of the segregationist 
private housing market.”170 
Kansas City’s City Planner, Perry Cookingham, shifted the city’s primary focus to 
urban redevelopment in 1946, introducing Kansas City’s Urban Redevelopment 
Ordinance and proposing several urban redevelopment projects, including a 
comprehensive highway system that would connect Kansas City, Missouri, Kansas City, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development, 79-80. 
169 Webster, 41-42. 




Kansas, and North Kansas City in anticipation of a federal highway system.171  By 1947, 
Cookingham’s City Plan Commission fully embraced urban renewal, informing city 
council that “the provision of housing, and the redevelopment of the city’s blighted areas 
are of primary importance.”172  
From its onset, urban redevelopment within Kansas City targeted minority 
concentrated areas, demonstrated through City Plan Commission’s first proposed 
redevelopment project known as Rosary Plaza in 1946.  Rosary Plaza was to replace a 
large portion of the Belvidere area, which remained primarily black throughout the 
1940s.  Although seventy-three preexisting units occupied the proposed area, 
redevelopment plans suggested removing all but one, replacing them with two hundred 
and eight white, owner-occupied, single-family dwellings. 173  Although the Rosary Plaza 
plan does not mention the fate of displaced residents, it states that municipal programs 
would assist residents to “whatever extent becomes necessary to ensure satisfactory 
relocation.”174  Because of this, members of city council ultimately rejected the proposed 
Rosary Plaza, since they did not believe that this redevelopment project met Section VII 
paragraph “e” of the Urban Redevelopment Ordinance governing housing 
accommodations for displaced residents.175  
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Although the Rosary Plaza project never materialized, it shows early efforts to 
target minority occupied areas in accordance with Section VII of the Urban 
Redevelopment Ordinance.  This regulation established the city’s definition for blighted 
areas through “data pertaining to topography, vacant land, existing land use, rental 
values, land values, tax delinquency, the availability of adequate services such as streets, 
sewers, and water, population density, overcrowding, and the location of areas occupied 
largely by minority groups.”176  An examination of Section VII of the Urban 
Redevelopment Ordinance and the proposed placement of Rosary Plaza reveals that 
Kansas City’s urban redevelopment projects intended to target minority occupied 
neighborhoods.  These neighborhoods generally suffered from low property and rental 
values primarily resulting from real estate efforts combined with the modern mortgage 
system, high tax delinquency, overcrowding, and a lack of street, sewer, and water 
maintenance. 
Kansas City’s standard definition of blight never deviated from the basic criteria 
found in the original Urban Redevelopment Ordinance.  Community Renewal Report 1 
(1967) outlines the same principals for blight measurement, stating that blight within 
Kansas City would be defined by poor building arrangement, a lack of sanitary facilities, 
depreciated land values, and areas where “absentee owners are indifferent to the 
conditions of their property and are willing to profit from overcrowding.”177  Generally, 
these blighted areas suffered from structures where the cost of renovation exceeded the 
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cost of new construction, where multiple families occupied “standard” single-family 
homes, or where properties did not meet housing code requiring adequate heat, plumbing, 
and the condition of building materials.178  Although Kansas City’s definition of blight 
cites specific areas of the city as standards for blight, its measurement is broad, leaving 
much to the city’s discretion.  
Kansas City’s 1967 definition of blight clearly identified overcrowded and 
dilapidated buildings owned by people living outside of the city and profiting from high 
rents.  Edward Goetz argues that the municipal government’s tendency to target minority-
populated areas was the result of the area’s declining condition, the need for improved 
housing within black communities, resistance from white middle class communities, and 
the fear of being in direct competition with private real estate developers.  He states, 
“When white middle class communities resisted the placement of public housing in their 
midst, local elected officials steered projects into black slums.”179   
As debate continued at the federal level, Congress passed the Housing Act of 
1949, providing federal subsidies for property acquisition and authorizing the creation of 
810 thousand public housing units over ten years.  However, HUD only built 250 
thousand units by 1960 because of lobbying efforts by the NAREB.180  It was under the 
Housing Act of 1949 that Kansas City began implementing urban redevelopment.  Their 
first target was Quality Hill, which lost its elite status of the late 1800s and became 
primarily occupied by the working class and minorities.  Cookingham’s next target was 
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the Negro populated Church Hill district.  Urban renewal projects cleared this area, south 
of Twelfth Street, for municipal buildings, and razed the area north of Twelfth in hopes 
of creating middle-income housing.181  
After these early efforts, the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority 
(LCRA), created by the State of Missouri in 1953 in accordance with the Housing Act of 
1949, administered most of Kansas City’s urban redevelopment projects.  Working 
primarily with local governments and business interests, federal officials who 
administered urban redevelopment funding played a decidedly subordinate role within the 
LCRA, which members of the private sector staffed.182  Although state chartered, LCRA 
plans were subject to the approval of the City Plan Commission and city council before 
submitting it to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).183  This system gave considerable control to Kansas City’s municipal 
government over the location of redevelopment and public housing.  
From 1953 to 1969, the LCRA started eighteen urban renewal projects within 
Kansas City, again focusing on minority-occupied neighborhoods.  Several renewal 
projects demonstrated minority targeting; those projects included Attucks, displacing 478 
blacks and no whites; Manual, displacing 320 blacks and four whites; and Twelfth and 
Vine, displacing 309 blacks and 19 whites.  In total, the LCRA’s urban renewal projects 
of the 1960s and 1970s displaced 1,783 blacks, 1,960 whites, and 755 businesses within 
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Kansas City, Missouri.184  Although displacing more white residents than black, these 
numbers are disproportionate to Kansas City’s total population.  Whereas Kansas City’s 
black residents only constituted 17.5% of Kansas City, Missouri’s population in 1960, 
48% of residents displaced by LCRA projects were black.185  Other major projects 
conducted by the city, including the acquisition of land for the CBD Loop, Interstate 35, 
Interstate 70, and the South Midtown Freeway, displaced 2,473 blacks and 6,172 
whites.186  This type of highway expansion within the inner city became increasingly 
common throughout the 1960s and 1970s when government transportation investment 
shifted towards suburban highways.187  (Refer to Appendix C) 
Since both the Housing Act of 1949 and Kansas City’s Urban Redevelopment 
Ordinance required accommodations for displaced residents, Kansas City’s municipal 
government and HAKC turned to public housing to absorb dislocated families.  Despite 
efforts made by civic organizations, such as the Greater Kansas City Urban League, to 
convince city officials to build public housing on vacant lots outside of the city, HAKC 
placed most of its 1950s and 1960s units within the urban core.188  These units, 
segregated by race until 1964, included Guinotte Manor near Fourth and Troost, 
Riverview near Fifth and Paseo, T.B. Watkins Homes near Thirteenth and Vine, and 
Wayne Miner Court near Ninth and Woodland.  While the white only housing units were 
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located north of Independence Avenue, black occupied public housing units such as 
Wayne Miner and T.B. Watkins Homes were located in the Vine Street corridor, which 
had remained predominately black since the late 1800s.189  
By the mid-1960s, government agencies including the National Commission on 
Urban Problems, the President’s Committee on Urban Housing, and the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights determined that FHA policy corresponded directly to the 
decline of urban cores.  Because of redlining found within FHA loans, federal policy 
makers passed the 1968 Housing Act, which required the FHA to make loans to 
moneylenders in inner city areas.  The hope was to establish federally insured loans for 
low-income areas by paying lending institutions directly.  This would ensure mortgage 
payments were backed by risk insurance that protected these institutions from 
foreclosures.    Sections 235 and 236 the 1968 Housing Act thus lowered FHA standards 
so that low-income families could obtain mortgages or rent subsidies to move into private 
rather than public housing.190  Kevin Gotham states that this new FHA policy made 
lending in low-income areas “a risk-risk free venture for lenders who could get FHA 
approval on almost any dwelling, service the loan for a lucrative fee, and then sell the 
mortgage back to the federal government.”191 
Kansas City administered the Section 235 program between 1969 and 1974, 
which included units built or rehabilitated by HUD subsidized developers.  The Section 
235 constructed most new houses in suburban areas within Kansas City, potentially 
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giving minority residents an opportunity to relocate outside of the inner city.  However, a 
1971 study by the U.S. Commission of Civil Rights found that whites were the primary 
purchasers of these new suburban units while minorities purchased the limited units built 
within the inner city.  Kansas City’s African Americans used roughly 90% of their FHA 
loans to purchase preexisting homes, while their white counterparts only used 9.6% of 
their FHA loans on existing homes.  In total, 93.5% of all preexisting homes purchased 
with FHA loans were located within the inner city.  The biggest consumers of these FHA 
loans were real estate agencies that made minor cosmetic changes to foreclosed homes 
within the inner city and then resold them to minorities at inflated prices.  
This program not only maintained the status quo within FHA lending, but it also 
fostered conditions for panic selling and white-flight to Kansas City’s suburbs, where 
working class white families could now purchase homes.  Although interracial 
neighborhoods made efforts to form coalitions and campaign door-to-door to discourage 
white-flight and profiteering real estate agendas, these efforts were rarely successful.  In 
addition, Section 235 policies also stimulated housing abandonment by lending to 
unstable recipients who failed to repay FHA loans, leading to urban decay within Kansas 
City.  Ninety-nine percent of foreclosed homes under Section 235 were located within the 
urban core.192 
By 1971, city officials within Kansas City became aware of the adverse effects of 
the Section 235 program, and Councilman Joseph Shaughnessy requested that HUD meet 
with the city’s Housing Advisory Commission to discuss the removal of Section 235 
housing from Kansas City.  Although it is unclear how HUD responded to Kansas City’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




request, it terminated the Section 235 program in 1973 after President Nixon’s 
moratorium on all public housing programs.  Although Nixon aimed to prevent redlining 
and real estate blockbusting, the end of Section 235 saw banks that were still unwilling to 
lend to inner-city residents without federal backing.193 
While participating in the Section 235 program, Kansas City’s Model Cities 
Administration worked in cooperation with the Housing Development Corporation and 
Information Center in December of 1970 to design a small housing allowance program 
known as the Kansas City Direct Housing Allowance (DHA).  Unlike the Section 235 
program, the DHA program was designed to allow participants to move anywhere within 
Kansas City in hopes of providing housing to working class families by subsidizing up to 
one hundred and four dollars of rent per month.  Although the majority of participants in 
the DHA program, both black and white, obtained higher quality housing and benefited 
from improved neighborhoods by moving outside of the inner city, these participants 
were most likely to move into racially segregated communities.194  Based on these 
results, contemporary authors Arthur Soloman and Chester Fenton concluded, “There is 
no reason to expect that the degree of racial discrimination and prejudice will be lessened 
or that households locational preferences will be altered because of widespread direct 
housing allowance program has been implemented unless a major effort is made to 
enforce open housing legislation.”195  
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In 1968, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act forbade discriminatory practice in the 
sale or rental of property, advertising that indicates racial preference, blockbusting, and 
redlining, but it did not give incentive to nor require the promotion of suburban 
integration.  In addition, provisions within this act excluded single-family homes sold by 
individuals, boarding houses with four or more units, or housing owned by clubs or 
religious organizations, all of which covered roughly 20% of the housing market in 
1968.196  Although HUD made some efforts in the early 1970s to pressure housing 
authorities to locate public housing outside of the inner city, most municipal governments 
could not justify the political turmoil desegregated housing would create.  It was not until 
1974 that revisions made to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act required HUD to 
affirmatively promote fair housing.  These revisions implemented “fair-share” plans that 
would evenly distribute federally subsidized housing between blighted areas and the 
suburbs; however, few housing authorities enforced such efforts.  John Goering argues 
that ambiguities within Title VIII made it unclear whether HUD bore responsibility for 
ensuring integration or if it was simply HUD’s responsibility to expand housing 
opportunities that would allow housing desegregation.197  
To adhere to Title VIII legislation, Congress passed Section Eight of the Housing 
and Community Development Act, allowing HUD to shift its emphasis from subsidizing 
government built units to the direct subsidization of low-income residents.  Like Kansas 
City’s previous DHA program, Section Eight gave housing allowances to low-income 
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families, allowing them to find their own housing within the local market.198  As for 
Soloman and Fenton’s prediction, the federally backed Section Eight subsidy program 
did not change housing preferences within Kansas City.  Although some public housing 
tenants participated in the Section Eight program, the majority moved to neighborhoods 
with similar, or in some cases higher, minority populations.199  In addition to providing 
Section Eight housing subsidies, HAKC turned its primary focus to the rehabilitation of 
preexisting structures after the passage of Title VIII, acquiring eight-million for 
rehabilitation projects between 1975 and 1980.200  Although HAKC, like HUD, shifted its 
focus away from the construction of segregated housing units, these rehabilitation efforts, 
like those that came before it, continued to place public housing within the inner city.  
Kansas City Missouri’s municipal government created the Office of Housing and 
Community Development in 1975 to administer the Community Development Block 
Grant Program (CDBG) after realizing that urban renewal did not revitalize the city’s 
core.  The CDBG provided funding for the development of quality apartments, as well as 
grants and loans made by the Rehabilitation Loan Corporation to minorities and families 
who sought to meet the minimum housing code.  Between 1975 and 1980, the Office of 
Housing and Community Development awarded 126 million in CDBG funds.201  
Although these efforts met the original goal of revitalizing some of Kansas City’s urban 
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core and helping to increase land value in many minority areas at little or no cost to 
landowners, it did not encourage any type of integration among Kansas City’s housing 
stock since minorities could now improve their community or living conditions without 
leaving the urban core.  
 
The Decline of Public Housing 
 
Like most public housing projects, low budgets and mismanagement plagued 
Kansas City’s low-income housing, leading to a drastic increase in the demolition and 
sale of public housing projects during the 1980s.  Nationally, fifteen thousand units were 
demolished between 1978 and 1989.  Although there was little coordinated policy by 
HUD for disinvestment, most public housing authorities (PHA) found HUD willing to 
allow it.  In order for these housing authorities to demolish or sell public housing, 
approval had to be granted by HUD, which required that two conditions be met:  first, 
that the public housing in question be classified as obsolete and second, that the local 
housing authority had consulted with its residents before applying for disinvestment.  
Since HUD did not closely supervise most housing authorities, it approved several 
disinvestment applications without independent verification.  Because of this, local PHAs 
participated in de facto demolition by discontinuing the maintenance its of units long 
before applying to HUD for disinvestment.202  Edward Goetz states,  
In a case of de-facto demolition, a PHA in effect introduces the physical 
obsolescence that is required for demolition approval through willful neglect of 
the public housing project, allowing physical problems at the site to go 
uncorrected, creating the conditions for vandalism by keeping large numbers of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




units vacant, and allowing major building systems to decline significantly to the 
point that repairs become prohibitively expensive.203 
 
Kansas City began its participation in public housing demolition by thinning its 
existing stock.  For example, HAKC demolished the high-rise portion of Wayne Miner 
Court, leaving the low-rise housing that accompanied it.  HAKC believed that this 
clearance of dilapidated housing would protect other public housing ventures.  The initial 
thinning of Kansas City’s public housing stock eventually led to complete abandonment, 
with HAKC turning to de-facto demolition to clear units such as Watkins Homes and the 
remnants of Wayne Miner.204  Although HUD destroyed or sold public housing at 
increasing rates, it added Section Eight and revitalized units at a rate of 7,149 units per 
year during the last half of 1980.  This transition resulted from the 1969 Housing Act that 
required one-for-one relocation assistance and the conversion of HOPE VI into a 
demolition program.205  Wayne Miner was completely demolished only thirty years after 
its completion, costing 9.4 million in demolition and HOPE VI construction.206 
 
Kansas City’s Human Relations Commission 
 
Although it is clear that Kansas City’s municipal policy influenced the 
continuance of segregation through its urban renewal and public housing projects, the 
city council made some efforts to curb segregation via the creation of Kansas City’s 
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Commission on Human Relations, charted in ordinance no. 15091 in November of 1951.  
As early as May 2, 1952 the newly created Human Relations Commission received its 
first housing discrimination case involving Charles Crittenden, a black man who was in 
the process of purchasing property in an all-white neighborhood.  Before Charles moved 
into that neighborhood, the Human Relations Commission took it upon itself to poll the 
neighborhood’s residents to determine their receptiveness to black neighbors.  Although 
the commission concluded that their “findings indicated peaceable acceptance,” 
Crittenden’s house was bombed on May 21st.  
In attempts to deal with their first housing segregation case, the Kansas City 
Human Relations Commission was powerless and could only assist the police chief on 
Crittenden’s case, offering a $1,000 reward for information regarding the bombers.  Soon 
after the bombing, real estate agencies swooped into Crittenden’s neighborhood, taking 
advantage of the neighbors and buying their houses cheaply.  Although the Human 
Relations Commission attempted to combat real estate blockbusting efforts through door-
to-door campaigns and by appealing to the Troost Park Homes Association, it had no 
legal means of stopping panic selling. 207  In their First Annual Report, the Human 
Relations Commission stated, “Despite [door-to-door campaigns, the appeals to the 
Troost Park Homes Association,] and other efforts by the Commission and the 
Association to reduce the hysteria and panic of the white residents, for sale signs began to 
appear on [Crittenden’s] block in large numbers.”208 
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Although the Human Relations Commission could not legally bring charges upon 
the participants of housing segregation, it worked within its means to promote human 
relations/rights courses at colleges, in civic and police programs, and open seminars.209  
In addition, Kansas City’s Human Relations Commission repeatedly voiced specific 
concerns to city council about its urban renewal projects and its effects upon displaced 
Negroes who had been pressured by real estate blockbusting efforts as early as 1954.210  
reveals one example of the campaign to end housing segregation and curb panic selling.  
Publications such as the Human Relations Commission’s Learning to be Human (1969) 
encouraged the formation of human relations groups within communities.  Within these 
groups, the Human Relations Commission suggested that members identify their racial 
fears and prejudice, become aware of derogatory racial words, educate themselves on the 
history of civil rights, and discuss resolutions to the effects of racism.211  Although most 
of the Human Relations Commission’s work focused on finding the root of segregationist 
efforts, Learning to be Human warns that “to accept the fact that white racism is the basic 
cause of racial conflict in America is not enough,” and that proactive measures are 
quintessential to stopping segregation.212   
Official fair housing policy began in Kansas City in 1967 under Sections 26.215 
through 26.222 of the city charter, which prohibited the refusal of sale or rent; the 
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publication of housing articles limiting race; the refusal of insurance; and the denial of 
loans or financial assistance based on race, punishable by a thirty-day suspension of 
license.213  Although this punishment may appear weak, a 1971 report conducted by 
Missouri’s Commission on Human Rights claimed that Kansas City’s municipal laws 
governing discriminatory practices within real estate agencies, lending institutions, and 
advertising were the strictest of all Missouri cities at the time.  This report also indicated 
that Kansas City was the only major Missouri city as of 1971, aside from St. Louis, to 
include laws governing discriminatory practices in public accommodations, government 
hiring and contracts, employment, and housing.  All other major Missouri cities had laws 
governing one or two of these practices, aside from Lee’s Summit, which had no human 
relations agency.214  Although Kansas City’s 1967 fair housing policy gave some 
additional power to the Human Relations Commission, it was not until 1981 that city 
council recognized their lack of remedial powers and appointed them to work in 
conjunction with the Civil Rights Board in order to enforce anti-discrimination code.215  
Although states such as Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode 
Island, and Washington gave human relations agencies the power to legally enforce non-
discrimination policy as early as 1959, the State of Missouri did not grant charter cities 
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such powers until 1989, hindering the Kansas City Human Relations Commission from 




Federal, state, and municipal conduct contributed to the persistence of housing 
segregation through public housing and urban renewal within Kansas City, culminating in 
programs that displaced low-income residents and placed them into public housing within 
the inner city, further concentrating minority groups within the urban core.  Although 
state chartered agencies HAKC and the LCRA conducted most of Kansas City’s 
redevelopment and public housing projects, municipal agencies such as city council and 
the City Plan Commission held considerable control over the laws governing urban 
redevelopment and its placement.  Edward Goetz states, “City councils and mayors had 
influence over the siting of public housing projects as each project required a 
‘cooperation agreement’ between PHA and the local council.”217  Although Kansas City’s 
Human Relations Commission attempted to warn city officials about LCRA practices, 
their limited authority only allowed them to suggest the restructuring of relocation 
practices.218  
Despite 1959 federal laws that banned the use of public housing funds to 
discriminate based on race, local housing authorities were able to maintain racial 
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segregation through the location of public housing and weak HUD supervision.219  
Contemporary Don Hager states, “Officials and city councils have manipulated and 
restricted the choice of sites for housing developments and these practices have been 
accomplished in such fashion that discrimination cannot be detected nor brought under 
judicial review.”220  Although Kansas City’s municipal government later attempted to 
curb segregationist real estate efforts through the fair housing ordinance of 1967, the 
Human Relations Commission had no power to enforce non-discrimination law until 
1989, when Missouri State Legislature granted local human rights commissions with law-
enforcing powers.  Other efforts to decentralize the inner city through local housing 
programs such as the DHA fell short because of a lack of participation by minorities, 
most likely resulting from ingrained stereotypes and real estate blockbusting. 
Slums cleared to provide public housing later returned to slum conditions, often 
because of de-facto demolition attempts and foreclosures.  Hager states, “There is 
considerable doubt that urban renewal has, in fact, accomplished any serious reduction of 
slums or blighted areas because, in nearly every instance, new slums have been created 
and expanded by crowding re-located minorities into adjacent areas already on the way to 
becoming slums.”221  Kansas City’s Vine Street corridor, which had become the target of 
the bulk of Kansas City’s renewal projects, demonstrates this point.  Instead of 
revitalizing or eliminating the overcrowded Vine Street area, residents displaced by urban 
renewal simply moved to the adjacent area to the south.  Although it is clear that both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






federal and state conduct certainly influenced housing segregation within Kansas City, its 
municipal government could have taken several decentralizing measures that would have 
brought displaced residents outside of the urban core via the placement of housing 














THE EFFECTS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ON HOUSING 
 
During the implementation of urban renewal and public housing within Kansas 
City, significant racial movement began in the 1950s with the migration of black 
residents to the southeastern section of Kansas City.  Bound to the north by Twenty-
Seventh Street and to the east by Troost Avenue, this section of the city transitioned from 
predominantly white to all-black neighborhoods.  Although urban renewal efforts pushed 
some black residents east of Troost, this significant change in the racial makeup of 
Kansas City was primarily the result of Kansas City, Missouri School District’s 
(KCMSD) efforts to maintain racially segregated schools through the use of Troost 
Avenue as a school attendance boundary between 1954 and 1975.222  KCMSD’s 
implementation of school desegregation spurred real estate officials to conduct 
blockbusting and racial steering efforts, forcing mass suburbanization and leaving Kansas 
City’s schools primarily black.  
Prior to 1954, KCMSD adhered to state-sanctioned segregated school districts 
with whites attending schools primarily located within the suburbs.  In response to the 
1954 Supreme Court ruling of Brown v. the Topeka Board of Education and after the 
state of Missouri relinquished state control over the placement of local school boundaries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




in 1954, KCMSD eliminated segregated school districts, replacing them with 
neighborhood attendance zones.223  Troost Avenue defined the attendance zones for 
Westport High, Southwest High, Central High, Lincoln High, Paseo High, and Southeast 
High, leaving most preexisting black schools east of Troost.  Although several schools, 
including Attucks and Dunbar, had no white students before 1955, KCMSD did not try to 
enforce extensive busing for balanced attendance, letting these schools retain their all-
black status.224 
 
Real Estate Blockbusting 1950-1970 
 
Taking advantage of KCMSD’s neighborhood attendance practices, Kansas City’s 
real estate agencies started advertising property by its location, east or west of Troost, as 
early as the late 1950s.  Kevin Gotham states that is action “implicitly designated the race 
of those to whom property was available within the city.”225  The use of the Troost divide 
by the KCMSD sparked a wave of blockbusting efforts within Kansas City’s real estate 
markets east of Troost.  Although blockbusting or panic selling was not new to Kansas 
City in the 1950s and 1960s, it had only occurred on a limited scale.  It was not until this 
time that real estate blockbusting efforts became a widespread practice, affecting entire 
sections of the city.226  (Refer to appendix D and E)  
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In 1961, both white and black residents appealed to the Kansas City Commission 
on Human Relations for aid in preventing racial turnover among neighborhoods.  
However, Kansas City’s Human Relations Commission had very limited powers during 
the peak blockbusting years.  The Commission only held the power of influence and had 
no legal means of enforcing discriminatory law.  However, these grassroots efforts paired 
with the backing of Kansas City’s Human Relations Commission did lead Kansas City, 
Missouri’s City Council to pass a 1964 city ordinance outlawing blockbusting.  By 1967, 
Kansas City’s municipal court held numerous cases concerning the violation of the city’s 
blockbusting ordinance.227  
Despite these efforts, mass blockbusting before the mid-1960s, paired with the 
Section 235 program that made affordable housing available within white suburban areas, 
had already left the area east of Troost Avenue primarily black.228  Kevin Gotham argues 
that Kansas City’s 1964 blockbusting ordinance, Kansas City’s 1967 fair housing 
ordinance, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 all failed to eliminate segregated 
neighborhoods within Kansas City; their reactive nature did not challenge real estate 
agents’ steering practices that maintained racial segregation.  Instead, discrimination laws 
simply respond to fair housing violations rather than having an affirmative action plan.229  
In addition, white residents continued to flow out of Kansas City’s inner city, even 
without the influence of realtors, after KCMSD’s school system began declining during 
the 1970s.  After 1969, nineteen proposed tax increases for school funding failed to pass 
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within inner city areas.  This lack of funding caused a loss in teachers, maintenance, and 
educational standards, leading to the further suburbanization of Kansas City’s 
residents.230  
Because of real estate agent blockbusting efforts during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
area targeted east of Troost Avenue saw the white population fall from 126,229 residents 
in 1950 to 33,804 in 1970, while black occupancy rose from 41,348 residents in 1950 to 
102,741 in 1970.231  By 1970, 88% of Kansas City’s black population lived within thirty-
five census tracts, namely in the southeast section of the city.  While only three census 
tracts held a racial mix of 90% black or higher in 1950, nineteen census tracts were at 
least 90% black by 1970, all located east of Troost Avenue, thus causing an influx of 
black students into these schools.  High Schools such as Central, Paseo, and Southeast 
went from all white in 1955 to over 97% black by 1975.232  Several schools east of Troost 
followed this trend and became primarily attended by black students or retained their 
black attendance.  (Refer to appendix F) 
 
Court Ordered School Desegregation 
 
In response to Kansas City’s increasingly segregated schools after Brown v. 
Board, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that KCMSD 
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had not met voluntary desegregation compliance in March of 1975.233  This ruling 
spurred the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to notify KCMSD that it was not complying 
with civil rights law because KCMSD had not desegregated its schools but had 
maintained an inferior curriculum and faculty in minority schools.  Although KCMSD 
submitted a desegregation plan on July 14, 1975 in compliance with the OCR, it rejected 
KCMSD’s plan, causing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to cut 
off federal funding in 1977.234  By this time, KCMSD’s enrollment was 69.3% black, up 
from its black enrollment of 10-20% in the 1950s.  School districts outside of Kansas 
City remained almost completely white as of 1977.  These suburban districts include 
North Kansas City at .5% black, Independence at 1.1% black, Raytown at 3.0% black, 
and Hickman Mills at 6.9% black.235  Because of KCMSD’s high minority enrollment, 
the school board planned a regulatory lawsuit, later known as Missouri v. Jenkins, to 
condense KCMSD with suburban districts since it could no longer meet the level of 
integration mandated by HEW.236 
By 1985, United States District Judge Russell G. Clark ruled in favor of the 
consolidation of KCMSD with eleven suburban school districts.237  KCMSD fully 
supported Judge Clark’s decision, stating, “Consolidation of school districts is the only 
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remedy which realistically promises to eradicate the deeply ingrained, area wide vestiges 
of the state’s original constitutional violation.”238  KCMSD’s resulting consolidation plan 
of 1985 included the consolidation of KCSMD, Blue Springs, Center, Fort Osage, 
Grandview, Hickman Mills, Independence, Lee’s Summit, Liberty, North Kansas City, 
Park Hill, and Raytown into one district, assigning each school an enrollment of 20-40% 
minority attendance to be accomplished via extensive busing.239  Although other school 
districts throughout the United States had previously implemented the consolidation of 
school districts with varying results, the Eighth United States Circuit Court dismissed the 
eleven school districts from consolidation on December 5, 1986, claiming the court could 
not order these districts to participate.240  In lieu of this decision, Judge Clark raised 
property taxes and state funding for KCMSD, granting the school district an extra 200 
million dollars to establish “magnet” schools.241 
In 1988, the KCMSD established its first magnet schools, including Hartman, 
Cook, and Marlborough, intending to draw white students back into the district by 
implementing capital improvements, staff development, and a new administrative 
structure.  James Shortridge states, “People argued that if the quality of instruction was 
high, the buildings modern, and the programs innovative, students from all over the 
region would want to attend.”242  Although KCMSD invested millions in new magnet 
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schools, advertising, and busing, the magnet program failed.  Shortridge states, “No more 
than 1,500 white suburban students enrolled in the schools in any one year, and it was 
rare for any of these pupils to stay longer than a semester.”243  Historian Joshua Dunn 
states that the magnet school program was such a failure that “even those most heavily 
invested in Judge Clark’s program could not report that his plan was successful.”244  
By 1995, the United State Supreme Court ended court control over KCMSD, 
resulting in a record high of 77.9% black school attendance for the year.245  After court 
dismissal of KCMSD’s magnet program, declining maintenance and educational 
standards caused the school district to continually lose students to suburban schools.  
KCMSD’s enrollment had dropped from a peak of seventy-five thousand enrollees to 
seventeen thousand in 2012.  This loss in enrollment, paired with a lack of maintenance, 




It is clear that KCMSD’s mandated neighborhood attendance zones spurred a 
racial movement within Kansas City that furthered the segregation of the city’s housing 
market.  Although KCMSD’s early efforts did not directly influence the suburbanization 
of Kansas City’s whites, it did give real estate officials a means of creating an 
environment conducive to panic selling, which had been heightened by KCMSD’s 
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declining academic standards and facilities.  Since KCMSD operates outside of Kansas 
City’s municipal government, the city, which had no control over KCMSD policy, did 
not directly challenge any of KCMSD’s actions.  Joshua Dunn states, “Kansas City’s 
government and the KCMSD are distinct, with the mayor and city council rarely 
meddling in KCMSD’s affairs.”247  Despite city council’s inactive role within the school 
district, Kansas City residents, including members of the municipal government, and 
civic organizations made repeated efforts to protest KCMSD’s segregationist policy.  
However, Kevin Gotham states, “The KCMSD repeatedly justified its segregated school 
attendance boundary policies on the grounds that ‘neighborhood unity’, ‘neighborhood 
autonomy’, and ‘neighborhood stability’ had to be preserved before school integration 
could go forward.”248 
Even without direct influence over KCMSD policy, Kansas City’s municipal 
government could have taken a more proactive stance in the enforcement of segregation 
law.  Although city organizations such as the Human Relation Commission warned white 
residents about real estate blockbusting efforts by educating Kansas City’s populous 
about racial steering techniques, it had no law enforcing power.  In addition, Kansas 
City’s 1964 blockbusting ordinance and 1967 fair housing ordinance came after 
blockbusting efforts had already turned over most areas east of Troost Avenue.  
Nevertheless, a 1971 report conducted by Missouri’s Commission on Human Rights 
claims that Kansas City’s municipal laws governing discriminatory practices within real 
estate agencies, lending institutions, and advertising were the strictest of all Missouri 
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cities at the time.249  Although some real estate officials faced trial for violating Kansas 
City’s blockbusting ordinance, the nature of said ordinance was reactionary, only 
responding to complaints instead of actively seeking realtors that conducted racial 
steering practices.250 
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During the 1990s and 2000s, the racial landscape of Kansas City began to change 
drastically because of the actions taken by HAKC, KCSMD, and city council.  Although 
the Kansas City, Missouri City Council has lost considerable control over the 
implementation of urban renewal and public housing within recent years, it has begun to 
work within its limitations to foster integrated neighborhoods through its support of 
HAKC and the Human Relations Commission.  Although Kansas City has begun to move 
in a positive direction, efforts made by lending institutions and real estate agencies 
through the advent of subprime lending continued to damper integration efforts.  
 
Kansas City, Missouri’s Housing Policy 
 
Kansas City, Missouri’s first black mayor, Emanuel Cleaver, first sparked the 
ideological changes within Kansas City’s municipal government through his efforts to 
study race relations among Kansas City’s communities.  To accomplish this task, Mayor 
Cleaver commissioned a race-relations task force in 1996.  Although Cleaver’s task force 
found many discrepancies within Kansas City’s race relations, many policy-making 




Recourses, and city council, did not adopt any of the task force’s recommendations.251  
Richard Middleton argues this was most likely because “Kansas City’s large white 
middle class favors policies that are race neutral and that do not tend to point fingers or 
lay blame on white Americans for the social, economic, and political conditions of the 
city’s small black population.”252   
Although Mayor Cleaver’s race-relations task force failed to directly influence 
Kansas City’s policy-making agencies, it did influence Cleaver’s creation of a citywide 
rehabilitation effort called the Forging of Our Comprehensive Urban Strategy 
(FOCUS).253  Meant to stabilize areas facing physical and social decline while 
simultaneously developing vacant areas, FOCUS aimed to support “ongoing commitment 
by residents, businesses, and government to address existing conditions proactively, 
strategically approaching a desired future and constantly monitoring and evaluating 
progress for positive change within the neighborhoods of Kansas City.”254  Cleaver’s 
strategic approach to FOCUS ensured its success by turning the attention away from 
black communities and placing it on low-income areas.  Although most low-income areas 
are primarily minority occupied, this simple change in terms helped gain support from 
Kansas City policymakers, who “consistently demonstrate that they will not be beholden 
to politicians who decry racism and advocate special treatment of blacks versus 
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whites.”255  Although FOCUS does not implement a direct integration policy, it shows 
Kansas City’s attempts to move forward by supplying the opportunity for low-income 
communities to increase their value and thus foster mixed income neighborhoods.  
Urban renewal projects enacted in the late 1990s and early 2000s would follow 
the pattern laid out by FOCUS.  These new projects attempted to aid communities both 
socially and economically, rather than displacing them. One example of this is Mayor 
Cleaver’s push for urban renewal in Kansas City’s black eastside.  Cleaver approved the 
allocation of 114 million to revitalize this area, creating the Negro League baseball 
museum and a jazz hall of fame in attempts to attract tourism and business to the area.  
Additional efforts include Kansas City, Missouri’s push to establish commercial retail 
stores within the urban core, thus adding jobs and stability to inner-city communities.256 
The exodus of middle class black residents from east Kansas City to suburban 
areas between 1990 and 2000 also contributed to this change in rhetoric.  James 
Shortridge states, “The presence of middle class black population in the suburbs helped 
the general public see that eastside problem in economic rather than racial terms.”257  
KCMSD’s loss of state accreditation in 2000 introduced some black families to suburban 
schools via KCMSD’s state-mandated obligation to bus students into suburban school 
districts.  This fueled black movement away from Kansas City’s urban core.258  
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The movement of middle class blacks away from Kansas City’s eastside also 
helped the implementation of urban renewal projects without the effects of massive 
displacement.  At first, speculative investors bought houses left by eastside residents, 
turning them into rental units, and improper maintenance left properties vacant on Kansas 
City’s eastside by the mid-1990s.  By 2010, Kansas City had roughly 10,900 vacant 
homes, most of which were located east of Troost.259  This increase in vacancy has thus 
provided the Kansas City, Missouri Municipal Government with urban renewal land east 
of Troost that will not displace or disrupt current communities.  Taking advantage of this, 
Kansas City spent roughly 114 million stimulating business revival within this area in 
hopes of revitalizing its social and economic status.  Although Kansas City enacted these 
measures and black movement away from Kansas City’s eastside has improved, the area 
east of Troost remains primarily black, while affluent suburbs, such as J.C. Nichols’ 
Mission Hills and the country club district, remain mostly white.260 
After the implementation of FOCUS, Kansas City, Missouri’s Office of the City 
Auditor called for a housing policy in 2000 that would unite all city organizations under 
one comprehensive housing plan.  In doing so, the Office of the City Auditor sought to 
establish defined goals and methods of achieving housing equality by “addressing all 
housing in the city, regardless of the department providing the service.”261  Although 
Kansas City never implemented any of the city auditor’s suggestions and has yet to unite 
under one housing policy, the efforts of the city auditor to encourage such a plan show 
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that Kansas City’s municipal government continues to seek policy improvements.  This 
demonstrates the success of FOCUS, which has prompted city organizations to shift their 
attention towards the development of housing policy in conjunction with urban planning. 
 
Kansas City, Missouri’s Public Housing 
 
At the federal level, HOPE VI launched in 1993 in response to the failure of 
public housing developments and the recommendation of the National Commission on 
Severely Distressed Public Housing.  By replacing public housing projects with lower 
density developments that provided high living standards and apartment management via 
third party contractors, HOPE VI sought to draw a wider income range into its public 
housing communities.  Policy analyst Alex Schwartz claims that the implementation of 
HOPE VI drastically increased neighborhood integration throughout the nation by 
creating mixed income public housing communities.  He states, “Few would disagree that 
HOPE VI developments represent a drastic improvement over the distressed public 
housing units they replaced.”262  However, HUD did not grant the continuance of assisted 
living to all residents displaced by HOPE VI.  
The implementation of HOPE VI, paired with the Quality Housing and Work 
Responsibility Act of 1998 and the creation of the Housing Choice Voucher, which 
allows housing authorities to establish multiple payment standards so that voucher 
recipients could rent in more expensive sections of cities, represented public housing 
policy’s move away from the building of new units and towards the maintenance of 
existing ones.  This policy shift caused the loss of 270 thousand public housing units 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





nationally between 1994 and 2008.  As of 2003, only 5% of the national housing stock 
was built after 1985.263  Kansas City’s public housing stock followed this national trend, 
falling from 6,159 units in 1997 to 1,922 units in 2009, representing a 68.8% decrease.264  
As HUD turned its focus to programs that would encourage the growth of socially 
mixed neighborhoods, HAKC ranked among HUD’s lowest performers, receiving a 
seventeen out of one hundred upon assessment in 1994.265  Because of HAKC’s low 
performance standards, a federal court ripped Kansas City’s municipal control away from 
the housing authority and named Jeffery Lines, president of TAG Associate Inc., as 
private receiver.266  With this change in structure and HAKC’s implementation of the 
new HUD agenda, the housing authority moved from one of the nation’s lowest 
performers to a high performance PHA in 2000.267 
Following the example of HUD, HAKC’s new policy focused on mixed income 
developments and the implementation of the Housing Choice Voucher.  During the 1990s 
and 2000s, HAKC created the “scattered site” plan which sought to place Section Eight 
and HOPE VI housing within “non-racially or economically impacted areas of Kansas 
City.”268  Although, Kansas City’s municipal government had lost all influence over 
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HAKC’s operations, city officials fully supported scattered site housing, funding seventy-
seven of the 212 scattered site units built in 1998.269 
Currently, HAKC continues its efforts to create mixed income housing units, 
demolishing 140 units in Chouteau Court under HOPE VI in 2012.270  The efforts of 
HAKC’s scattered site and choice voucher programs of the 1990s and 2000s have 
certainly attributed to Kansas City’s Negro tendency to move away from the urban core.  
However, the urban core remains the location of several public housing units and 
revitalization sites, restricting some of Kansas City’s low-income residents to the inner 
city where they have been located since the implementation of public housing. 
 
Lending and Housing Segregation 
  
Redlining and disparate impact segregation by lending institutions has also 
continued to affect housing patterns within Kansas City.  Nationally, blacks in the highest 
income group saw a greater denial mortgage rate than whites in the lowest income group 
in 2007.  Since the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA), revised in 1989, 
only includes a loan applicant’s race, gender, income, and census tract, while excluding 
an applicant’s assets, debt, employment, and credit history, it becomes difficult to come 
to a conclusion on the reasons for higher mortgage denial rates among African 
Americans.  Although these denial rates have fell roughly 20% from 1997 to 2007, this 
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increase in loan approval is a result of predatory lending practices and the subprime 
mortgage market of the late 1990s which attributed to increased foreclosures among 
African Americans.271  
Subprime lending in America saw an increase from $35 billion in 1994 to $650 
billion in 2005.  With the increase of the subprime market came the increase in predatory 
lending practices, which disregard the mortgage applicant’s ability to repay loans and, 
instead, focuses on the applicant’s property values.  These loans often include high third 
party, credit life, or broker fees, along with balloon interest rates designed to encourage 
foreclosures on properties that are worth more than the loans value.  During this period, 
blacks who often had no ability to repay debt received the majority of subprime loans.  
Because of these predatory practices, many African Americans defaulted on their homes, 
leading to lower credit scores, increased racial stereotypes within the mortgage market, 
and a migration of black residents back into the inner city.272 
Although the Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in almost all aspects of 
housing and mortgage markets, most historians agree that its enforcement efforts were 
weak because of compromises made in order for the act to pass Congress.  These 
omissions greatly limited HUD’s power to identify, hold hearings, or issue complaints on 
matters concerning the mortgage market.  Thus, victims of mortgage discrimination had 
to identify the discrimination on their own, enlist the assistance of a fair housing 
organization, and build a discrimination case within 180 days, hindering most individuals 
from ever filing complaints about subprime lending practices.  The subprime mortgage 
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market continued to flourish into the late 2000s even though the federal government 
enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act in 1994, which required lenders 
to disclose all fees and penalties included within a loan, the loan contract process, and 
default.273 
Within Kansas City, the municipal government could not control lending 
practices since each bank’s regulator generally enforces banking law.  In addition, an 
Office of Thrift Supervision and the Office of Comptroller of Currency decision in 2003 
mandated that state and local predatory laws do not apply to national and federally 
regulated thrifts or their mortgage subsidiaries, eliminating any direct bearing that Kansas 
City, Missouri could insert over predatory lending practices.  Kansas City’s municipal 
government has continually worked through its organizations to provide grants and other 
assistance to low-income families seeking to purchase a home, showing that Kansas City 





Currently, Kansas City’s minorities continue to move away from the inner city.  
Despite the municipal government’s lack of control over banking and public housing, it 
has shown improvements through the implementation of FOCUS and a shift in policy 
that now targets class instead of race.  Although privately controlled, Kansas City’s 
municipal government continues to support HAKC’s public housing projects, which 
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encourage socially mixed neighborhoods by placing housing units throughout the city.  In 
addition, Kansas City seeks to aid low-income homebuyers by offering grant assistance 
to minorities that cannot receive loans so that they may still obtain a home within the 
















Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal influence over the direction of housing 
segregation began as early as 1892 with the creation of the Board of Park 
Commissioners.  Although not created as a racial barrier, the parks and boulevards 
system served as one.  It is clear that the Board of Park Commissioners not only served to 
protect property value, but also to create permanent residential characteristics that would 
govern the growth of Kansas City’s suburban areas.  The construction of parks and 
boulevards also targeted blighted areas of the city, displacing black residents and placing 
them into preexisting racial enclaves that became increasingly overcrowded.  
Because of the growth of racial communities and slum conditions, Kansas City, 
Missouri’s municipal government created the Board of Public Welfare to investigate and 
aid blighted areas.  That board worked as an extension to charities, most of which did not 
benefit African American families.275  In addition, the Board of Public Welfare’s 
Research Bureau published reports that attributed slum conditions to Negroes, reinforcing 
the growing stereotype that blacks were responsible for low property values.  The Board 
of Public Welfare did little in the way of African American aid throughout its brief 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




history.  Instead, the board placed a greater emphasis on the exclusion of black residents 
from mixed race neighborhoods through its housing reports.276 
During the first decades of the twentieth century, Kansas City’s suburban 
movement began to expand with the popularization of the automobile and an increase in 
the city’s population.  With the growth of suburbs, community builders, such as J.C. 
Nichols, looked to secure property values by whatever means they could, leading to the 
advent of restrictive covenants and adjoining homeowners associations that excluded 
homebuyers by race.  As the federal government sought to rejuvenate the failing housing 
market during the Great Depression, real estate efforts helped create federal policy that 
supported racial restrictions through the FHA.277  Although Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) 
ruled racially restrictive covenants unenforceable, they became more prevalent among 
Kansas City’s suburbs.  Fearing a loss of patronage, local officials and Kansas City’s 
municipal agencies did not wish to make bold racial changes and excluded themselves 
from interfering with the residential segregation found in deed restrictions, homeowners 
associations, and racial steering practices until the creation of the Human Relations 
Commission in 1951 and the implementation of anti-discrimination law in the mid-
1960s.278  
As a result of decentralization, Kansas City’s municipal government began to 
fully embrace the eradication of slums through federally sponsored urban renewal 
projects beginning in the mid-1940s.  Although conducted through state chartered 
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agencies, city policies fully controlled these projects, which clearly targeted minority 
occupied areas.  Since federal and municipal policy provided displaced residents with 
housing accommodations, Kansas City’s municipal government turned to public housing 
to absorb displaced residents.  Public housing remained segregated by race until 1964, 
placing black housing in minority concentrated areas.279  By placing black housing units 
within the inner city, Kansas City’s municipal government drove more black residents 
into expanding racial communities.   
While federal policy shifted from housing developments to subsidy programs, 
HAKC participated in de facto demolition, steering minorities into revitalized inner city 
housing units.  Although Section Eight housing provided the working class with housing 
opportunities within suburban areas, HAKC generally only granted these suburban 
subsidies to whites.280  Similarly, HOPE VI suspended the one-for-one housing rule, 
allowing local PHAs to participate in the demolition of public housing more freely.  
Although HOPE VI sought to create racially and economically mixed communities, it 
generally provided a means for white working class residents to secure housing within 
suburban areas while blacks remained in racially segregated communities.281  The Section 
235 program also fueled the exodus of the working class from the inner city to suburban 
areas.  This program not only lowered FHA loan standers, allowing low-income residents 
to secure FHA home loans, but also created public housing within the suburbs.  Although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Shortridge, 106. 
280 Levin, Julie E., and Murray S. Levin, Tinsley v. Kemp – A Case History: How the 
Housing Authority of Kansas City, Missouri Evolved from a ‘Troubled’ Housing Authority to a 
‘High Performer,’ 2007 http://bit.ly/1KUE39Z  (accessed August 29, 2015).  





open to all races, black participation within these programs was weak.  Edward Goetz 
argues that blacks’ unwillingness to leave such communities stems from their 
“attachment to place and the desire to preserve informal support networks upon which 
they rely.”282  The HOPE VI choice voucher program also limits the creation of racially 
mixed communities.  Although designed to encourage racially mixed neighborhoods, 
movement within the program “is often determined by where other public housing exists, 
where rental units exist that qualify for the voucher program, or where land-lords are 
willing to accept such vouchers.”283 
After the Brown v. the Topeka Board of Education ruling, real estate agencies 
took advantage of KCMSD’s neighborhood-based attendance zones by implementing 
mass blockbusting that targeted the area east of Troost Avenue during 1950s and 1960s.  
Since Kansas City’s white residents began to seek schools outside of KCMSD that 
offered better staff, curriculums, and facilities, schools east of Troost saw an additional 
increase in segregation.284  Although Kansas City’s municipal government held no 
control over KCMSD, their Human Relations Commission worked to stop blockbusting 
efforts within their limits.  Because of their lack of remedial power, the Human Relations 
Commission failed to curb racial steering.  In addition, the Human Relations Commission 
could not influence the municipal segregation practices found in urban renewal and 
relocation assistance.  Although the commission warned the municipal government that 
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their urban renewal efforts exacerbated racial concentration and that municipal 
administration had not taken affirmative action, it could only suggest policy changes and 
held no authority to implement changes of their own.285  Kansas City, Missouri did not 
enact anti-discriminatory law until 1967.  By this time, federal, municipal, and private 
practices deeply ingrained racial stereotypes amongst Kansas City’s residents.  
Furthermore, the effects of block busting, deed restrictions, homeowners associations, 
school desegregation, and suburbanization had already segregated Kansas City’s 
metropolitan area before the passage of discriminatory law.  Gotham states, “Despite the 
passage of anti-discrimination statutes, private housing actors continue to market 
dwellings to separate racial groups on the assumption that racially homogeneous and 
segregated living patterns are acceptable and preferred by housing consumers.”286 
Kansas City, Missouri has yet to enact a unified housing policy even though their 
urban core remains primarily black and discussion on affirmative housing policy began 
under Mayor Cleaver’s FOCUS plan of 1997.  Because of a recent movement of black 
residents into Kansas City’s suburbs, Kansas City has fallen from the eighteenth most 
segregated city in 2000 to the thirty-sixth most in 2011.287  However, municipal efforts 
did little to contribute to Kansas City’s increase in black suburbanization.  Instead, 
KCMSD’s loss of accreditation, HAKC’s conversion to private receivership, and a shift 
in social norms that now view inner city problems in the terms of class instead of race 
have fueled black suburbanization.  The increased role of minority leaders within the 
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public, private, and civic arenas demonstrates this shift in social norms. James Shortridge 
sites Ollie Gates, an African American owner of a successful barbecue chain, as one such 
example. Gates’ contribution to the city has strengthened race relations through his 
philanthropy and community involvement.  Shortridge states, “Barbeque, in turn, through 
its expansion from a limited position in the black community to an enthusiastic 
embracement by the city as a whole, has played a powerful role in bridging racial 
divides.”288  
Although black suburbanization within Kansas City has brought many black 
residents outside of Kansas City’s urban core and has initiated a change in the way 
people view racial groups, several factors still constrict black residents to inner city areas.  
The works of Kevin Gotham, Lawrence Bobo, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, and Joyce Bell 
suggest that modern institutions deny the limitations faced by racial groups, ignore racial 
inequality, and claim that racial groups are comprised of individuals with equal 
opportunity.  Gotham states,  
Racial inequality and privilege is defended today not by overt references to race 
or explicit forms of racial discrimination, but through a deployment of colorblind 
ideology that emphasizes diversity, multiculturalism, individualism, competition, 
and laissez faire.289   
 
This rhetoric, paired with Kansas City, Missouri’s city manager system, explains 
why actions within Kansas City have not produced results.  Although Kansas City has 
implemented affirmative action plans, such as FOCUS, Kansas City, Missouri’s political 
structure requires joint approval from the mayor, city council, and the city manager.  As a 
result of the city manager system, Kansas City, Missouri has not implemented a unified 
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housing policy and individual agencies continue without a joint effort to desegregate the 
city.  (Refer to Appendix G) 
Examining the impact that Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal government had on 
housing segregation shows that the persistence of residential segregation strongly relied 
on municipal policy.  However, the involuntary segregation found in the municipal 
government’s relocation practices and their placement of public housing is not the only 
factor that led to residential housing segregation within Kansas City, Missouri.  Kansas 
City’s municipal government did directly shape the racial make-up of the city through its 
placement of public housing, parks, and boulevards, through the reactionary nature of its 
anti-discrimination law, and though the bolstering of racial stereotypes.  Yet, Kansas 
City’s municipal government took progressive steps though its Human Relations 
Commission and Direct Housing Allowance program to encourage racially mixed 
neighborhoods.  Kansas City’s black and white residents have participated in voluntary 
segregation, separating themselves without the influence of the public or private sector.  
While whites voluntarily segregated themselves through restrictive covenants and 
homeowners associations, black have voluntarily avoided municipal and federal 
programs to create racially mixed communities.   
Thus, Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal government has dictated the pattern of 
racial segregation within the city through its reactionary anti-segregation law that allowed 
the continuance of racial steering, the adverse effects of urban renewal, and the bolstering 
of racial stereotypes.  The municipal government does not hold the authority to interfere 
with other public and private organizations that encourage housing segregation or to force 




agencies have attempted to discourage segregationist efforts through their support of the 
Human Relations Commission and anti-discriminatory law, others have neglected to 
implement anti-segregation practices.  Therefore, these municipal organizations have 
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Population of Kansas City, Missouri: 1880-2010290 
 
 
Year  Total Population  Black Population Percent of Total 
 
1880  55,785    8143   14.6 
1890  132,716   13,700   10.3 
1900  163,752   17,567   10.7 
1910  248,381   23,566   9.5 
1920  324,410   30,719   9.5 
1930  399,178   38,574   9.7 
1940  399,178   41,574   10.4 
1950  456,622   55,682   12.2 
1960  475,539   83,130   17.5 
1970  507,330   112,120  22.1 
1980  448,159   122,699  27.4 
1990   435,146   128,768  29.4 
2000  441,545   137,879  31.2 
2010  459,787   142,748  31.0 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  



















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














Urban Renewal Projects Kansas City, Missouri 1960-1972292 
 
 
   Project Completion Displaced Blacks Displaced Whites 
Northside   1960    88   432 
Attucks  1965   478       0 
South Humboldt 1965     28   203 
Eastside  1965     88   582 
Woodland   1965     58   162 
Garfield  1965       0   131 
West Main  1966       0     27 
Hospital Hill  1967     46     47 
Trinity   1972       1   159 
Manual  1972   320      4 
Columbus Park 1972       0     59 
Attucks East  1972   367   129 
CBD    1972       0       6 
Twelfth & Vine 1972   309     19 
 
Total       1783   1960 
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APPENDIX F  
 
 
Percent of Black Student Enrollment in Selected Schools East of Troost295 
 
 
Year:   1950  1970 
 
Attucks 100  99.4 
Moore  2.2  92.6 
Dunbar 100  99.2 
Faxon   .7  92.5 
Greenwood 70.9  100 
Holmes 94.8  99.6 
Linwood 19.0  99.8 
Phillips 100  100 
Wooland 22.6  97.3 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Adapted from The School District of Kansas City, Missouri: Office of the 
Superintendent, Report on the Progress of Desegregation in the Kansas City Public Schools 
























	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296	  Adapted from the City of Kansas City, Missouri, http://kcmo.gov (accessed February 
9, 2016).  
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